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Israel-Sino Relations through  
the Prism of Advocacy Groups 
 
 
Mohammed Turki al-Sudairi 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Advocacy for the state of Israel – in the sense of attempting to favourably shape public and elite 
perceptions and discourses about the Jewish state and the nature of its conflict with the 
Palestinians and the surrounding Arab states – has been, and continues to be, of pivotal 
concern to both the Israeli government and pro-Israeli organisations operating in the United 
States and elsewhere. What underlines this advocacy – understood here to unfold through 
multiple media, academic, and political spaces – is a desire to [1] reinforce political (and 
cultural) identification and support for Israel and its narrative, and [2] more pressingly, to 
contain alternative critical discourses about the state and its role in various Middle Eastern 
conflicts. Although the US has been the main focus of these advocacy efforts – which is a 
natural byproduct of its position as a global hegemonic empire, the susceptibility of its political 
system to special interests, and more significantly, due to the presence of a sizable and 
influential Jewish American community sympathetic to Israeli and Zionist interests – there are 
signs of a nascent and increasingly sustained Israeli/Zionist advocacy effort directed at China 
(amongst other theatres) that, while conditioned by a unique Chinese cultural and political 
topography, seeks to influence prevailing attitudes and perceptions amongst Chinese scholars 
and political elite in ways conducive to the preservation and maximisation of Israeli interests 
over the long-term.  
 
This paper is interested in examining this advocacy within the Chinese context, and argues that 
there are two distinguishable forms of advocacy. The first is confined to the diplomatic and 
outreach efforts of the Israeli state which actively seeks to promote and propagandise the state’s 
national narratives and myths. This has been markedly typified by an ongoing multimillion-
dollar ‘Brand Israel’ campaign, launched in 2006, that has attempted to disassociate and de-
centre the state away from ‘conflict’ whilst simultaneously highlighting Israel’s high-tech 
modernity, cultural sophistication, and ‘ancient rootedness’ to the land of Palestine. As to be 
expected, this comprehensive public diplomacy effort has been first and foremost cultural in 
nature, and in the case of China has come to encompass a wide range of activities including the 
sponsorship of Israeli artistic performances,
1
 the funding and co-producing of joint art projects 
with Chinese counterparts,
2
 the showcasing of Israeli companies and technologies through the 
opening of so-called Einstein exhibitions,
3
 and the hosting of an Israeli presence in major 
Chinese events (for example, the $11 million Israeli pavilion in the 2010 Shanghai Expo).
4
 
Coupled with this cultural outreach is an academic dimension shaped by university exchange 
programmes
5
 supported by over 250 scholarships and fellowship opportunities
6
 available for 
Chinese students interested or studying in Israel.
7
 The effect of these cultural and academic 
initiatives is amplified by the utilisation of various communication mediums, including 
television (the successful airing in 2010 of the Israeli embassy-backed CCTV documentary 
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‘Walk Into Israel: the Land of Milk and Honey’) cinema (the Israeli Tourism Ministry backed 
the filming of a Chinese movie ‘Old Cinderella’ in Jerusalem as a way to boost Chinese 
tourism)
8
 and the Chinese blogosphere where the Israeli embassy and its consulates have come 
to maintain a robust and active presence in Chinese social media. Taken together, these forms 
of official Israeli advocacy are not atypical and fall easily within the observable norms practiced 
by European and US diplomatic missions in China.  
 
The second tier of advocacy unfolds mainly through a network of loosely affiliated but 
overlapping network of pro-Israeli organisations embracing a number of think tanks, 
universities, lobbyist groups, activists and major donors involved in hasbara – a Hebrew term 
for ‘explanation’ denoting the utilisation of diplomatic, media, and political mediums to clarify 
and defend Israel’s positions and actions. The aim of these pro-Israeli organisations and groups 
– which include the American Jewish Committee (AJC), the Sino-Israel Global Network and 
Academic Leadership (SIGNAL), the Charles and Lynn Schustermen Foundation, and the 
Diane and Guilford Glazer Fund, to name just a few of these NGOs and funders – is to re-
brand Israel’s image through the re-shaping of academic discourses about the Middle East and 
Israel in China. This focus on academia stems from a recognition amongst these organisations 
that “China’s foreign policy decisions are based on extensive consultations with scholars who 
work in a multi-hierarchical think tank system”9 rendering academic channels therefore – in 
light of the closed character of the political system in China – as suitable avenues for ‘effective 
lobbying’.  
 
These organisations employ a series of tactics and advocacy strategies (as well as narratives) 
mimicking those that have been already employed in the US over the past decade, but tailored 
for a Chinese context. These include the promotion of “Israel Studies Programs”, the 
consolidation and intensification of existing contacts between Israeli and US universities with 
their Chinese counterparts, funding and supporting Chinese scholars and students to come and 
study in Israel (or pro-Israeli institutions abroad,) and the sponsorship of a growing number of 
conferences, workshops and seminars bringing Israeli and Chinese policymakers, journalists 
and experts together in consultation and debate, amongst many other initiatives. These efforts 
are reinforced and supported not only by the Israeli state (and its missions) which has a history 
of outreach towards the Chinese media and academia, but also by a number of Chinese 
scholars and academics who, more often than not, are closely affiliated with these organisations 
through official and unofficial capacities, and mainly as a result of them being beneficiaries of 
the academic and fiscal opportunities offered by these same organisations.
10
 
 
This paper will largely focus on this second-tier form of advocacy and its agents. This choice is 
driven in part by the need to examine and better understand the role being played by pro-
Israeli organisations and groups in facilitating and reshaping the contours of Sino-Israeli 
relations, especially in light of their ability to operate successfully in environments that have 
been traditionally charged with political sensitivities and apprehensions regarding Israel. Added 
to this is their growing visibility and presence within the Chinese academic space, a 
phenomenon that has yet to be fully analysed or addressed within the literature dealing with 
Sino-Israel relations. Examining the goals and initiatives of these organisations, not to mention 
the ways in which they both re-shape and fit into official Israeli government strategies towards 
China, will serve to shed light on their potential influences in the formulation of Israeli and 
Chinese foreign policy over the coming years.  
 
For the purposes of this paper, the subject matter will be divided into two sections organised in 
a chronological fashion: the first section will examine the early contacts between Jewish 
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organisations in the US and Israel with Chinese scholars, focusing specifically on the 
indigenous development of Jewish studies in China in the 1980s and 1990s as an outcome of 
this initial contact. The second section will examine the evolution of pro-Israeli advocacy in 
Chinese academia from 2000 onwards while placing it firmly at the backdrop of the larger 
changes sweeping organisational and conceptual approaches to Israeli advocacy amongst the 
global Jewish communities of the West. This section will also look at the discourses and 
rationale driving pro-Israeli advocacy in China. 
 
 
Key Issues 
Before commencing with this paper, it would be prudent to first to highlight a number of key 
issues. First of all, this paper does not purport that there is any ‘Jewish’ conspiracy at work here, 
but rather, attempts to describe what is clearly a political phenomenon that is both rational and 
coherent in its processes and outcome, and certainly galvanised by a number of factors 
reflecting a strategic recalibration that sees the rising superpowers of Asia as the next advocacy 
theatres for Israel. Furthermore, the phenomenon itself has been acknowledged to have taken 
place – by pro-Israeli advocates themselves – with regards to India, albeit within a more 
politicised, and less academic context. Organisations like the AJC, the American Israeli Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and B’nai B’rith International for instance have all reportedly 
played a major role in promoting “links between India and Israel, including valuable support 
provided to the formation of an Indian lobby in the US”.11 Not only did such organisations help 
obtain the Bush administration’s approval for Israel’s Phalcon aerial reconnaissance plane sale 
to India (following a veto of the same sale to China prior) but have also worked actively to 
garner “congressional support of the US-India civilian nuclear agreement, a bilateral accord on 
full civil nuclear cooperation approved in 2008”.12 China is no different in that regard.  
 
Second, this paper does not wish to suggest that all ‘Jewish’ initiatives and activities (academic 
or otherwise) in China or elsewhere are necessarily the byproducts of pro-Israel advocacy. 
Their growth and proliferation in China has been driven by other factors that need to be 
considered seriously, such as: (1) the existence of a genuine scholarly interest within China for 
Hebrew and Judaic culture noticeable in the influences mentioned by the ‘first generation’ of 
‘Judaic’ scholars such as Pan Guang,13 Xu Xin,14 Wang Yi-Sha,15 Fu Youde,16 Chen Yiyi,17 and 
Zhang Qianhong
18
 amongst many others (with reasons encompassing everything from 
childhood interactions with the foreign Jewish families in Shanghai, interest in the history of the 
Kaifeng Jewish community, to the reading of Chinese translations of The Diary of Ann Frank 
and the Bible); (2) the growth of Christianity in China which in turn has fueled an interest in the 
Bible and the Hebrew traditions that underline it;
19
 (3) the interest in Israel as a successful and 
modern state worthy of emulation, and; (4) a domestic economic dimension that has 
encouraged local authorities – particularly in Kaifeng, Shanghai, and Harbin – to invest in 
cultural and historical sites associated with Jewish culture as a way to attract further investments 
and tourism from the global Jewish communities.
20
 In some cases, like in Harbin, the creation 
of Jewish institutes (and later on a Sino-Israeli research centre) was clearly part of such 
strategies.
21
 One could also add the process of (5) internalisation identified by Izabella 
Goikhman which describes the attempt by Chinese scholars to publicize their research globally 
as a means of receiving more knowledge transfers, greater funding (i.e., similar to the economic 
dimension mentioned above) and access to global institutions for further research.
22
 The 
internationalisation process is therefore one of building ‘capacity’ through the support of 
foreign institutions and organisations. Despite all this, however, it should be recognised that in 
many cases, ‘Jewish’ ventures have ultimately functioned as stepping stones for future Israeli 
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advocacy in the Chinese context, as this paper will come to show. This has been due to not 
only the strong association and overlap perceived by foreign Jewish donors and Chinese 
academics of all things Jewish and Israeli but also because of the penchant amongst pro-Israel 
groups to coopt and re-shape Jewish outlets for their own purposes.  
 
Connected to this is the question of whether it would be fair to consider Israeli-focused 
academic work a form of advocacy, not only in the case of China, but elsewhere as well. The 
emergence of Israeli regional studies cannot be considered outside the political context from 
which it emerged. It represents, as this paper will discuss below, a reaction on the part of the 
Jewish Diaspora – and later by the Israeli state – to perceived biases against Israel by the 
traditional centres of knowledge production about the Middle East in the US. This is not to say 
that the work produced by ‘Israeli-focused’ centres/ institutions is therefore unacademic or 
devoid of objectivity, but that the justifications underlying their creation emanated from a desire 
to mediate images and narratives about the state and foster a more appreciative and 
sympathetic climate around it. It is difficult therefore, in my personal estimation, to establish a 
strict line of differentiation between ‘Israeli Studies’ and ‘Israeli Advocacy’ as such. While 
certainly not ‘mouthpieces’ for the state, these centres/institutions cannot be disassociated from 
the political intent (and groups) behind them, a fact reiterated as much by the philanthropists, 
organizers, and activists involved in such efforts, both in the US and China. The involvement of 
the Israeli government as well as explicitly pro-Israeli advocacy groups in the development of 
such academic ventures – especially in China – supports this position and raises concerns about 
their ‘objectivity.’ This is of course a question for readers to decide for themselves, and I have 
dedicated a section below to discussing the advocacy dimension of Israeli-focused regional 
studies. I acknowledge that there will be disagreements with my assessment.  
 
The third point that needs to be emphasised is the agency of Chinese scholars and academics 
in all of this. Although Chinese scholars are – in some cases – actively soliciting funding and 
resources from pro-Israeli parties, and even supporting their growth in China, they continue to 
maintain their own independent views on Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is 
corroborated not only by Chen Yiyi’s survey on the dominant sentiments within the Chinese 
academic establishment, demonstrating that a respectable majority of scholars continue to 
espouse what are deemed as ‘pro-Palestinian views’, but also by my own correspondences with 
some of these scholars (especially those who have been seemingly ‘coopted’ by pro-Israeli 
organisations) which convinces me that, like all academic communities, most of these scholars 
do strive to maintain an objective understanding of Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict.
23
 While 
pro-Israeli donors and organisations may harbour certain hopes about the direction Chinese 
academia should take, institutions and centres in China remain beholden to Chinese interests 
and their work subject to such mechanisms as academic peer review. This does not diminish in 
any way the fact that an active campaign, which has intensified in the last few years, is taking 
place to change that reality on the ground or that some scholars – from the older but 
increasingly younger generations – are opting to reproduce and promote pro-Israeli narratives.  
 
The fourth and last point that should be made is that pro-Israeli advocacy has always depended 
to some extent on the state of Sino-Israeli relations. While non-government affiliated 
individuals and groups played a significant role in facilitating and improving political ties 
between Beijing and Tel Aviv (especially in the 1980s), their capacity to operate in China (or 
how low-key or open they were about their activities) was always contingent on how warm or 
cold relations were at any given moment. In the 1990s, for instance, when engagement between 
pro-Israeli organisations and Judaic centres in China first began in earnest, Sino-Israeli ties were 
shaped both by China’s growing appetite for Israeli weaponry and the budding pro-Beijing 
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sentiment found within the Israeli right-wing.
24
American objections to any further military sales 
to China, particularly in 2000
25
 but again in 2005, eviscerated the gains made over the last 
decade and led to what one former Israeli politician has described as “one of the most 
wretched chapters in Israel’s diplomatic history”.26 While it is not clear whether ties between 
pro-Israeli organisations and Chinese scholars were hampered at the time, what is certain 
however is that they strengthened significantly following the 2010 rebound in Sino-Israeli 
relations (although some situate the rebound back to 2007 when the then Israeli Prime 
Minister Erhud Olmert visited China) exemplified by the end of official inhibitions over the 
formal study of ‘Israel’ in 2009-2011. There is a reciprocal or reinforcing dynamic by which the 
state of Sino-Israeli relations informs the political environment defining the parameters of 
activity for pro-Israeli organisations. These groups in turn work to strengthen the relationship 
by providing a wider and more expansive form of outreach based on interpersonal contacts and 
institutional ties with China’s academic and political elite. 
  
 
Precursor to Israeli Advocacy in China: The 1980s and 1990s 
Throughout the 1980s and 90s, Israeli advocacy was largely a low-key and informal affair, 
dependent on the initiative of interested individuals and lacking in an overall strategy articulated 
either by the state of Israel or the Jewish Diaspora abroad. This was the result of several factors, 
the most important of which was the lack of any formal diplomatic ties between Israel and 
China prior to 1992. Despite the paced relaxation of the internal political environment 
following the 1979 reforms which enabled, in conjunction with China’s own reconciliation with 
the US in face of the Soviet threat, the establishment of clandestine intelligence and military ties 
with Israel, dialogue between Beijing and Tel Aviv let alone advocacy of any kind was quite 
circumscribed. Other complicating factors to consider is the ideological inheritance of the 
Chinese political space, which dictated a pro-Palestinian, pro-Arab stance at least in official 
rhetoric, the unfamiliarity of the culture, and the lack of a supporting infrastructure for pro-
Israel advocates to operate freely and effectively (including the absence of a sizable Jewish 
community and the closed nature of the Chinese political and academic systems). One could 
perhaps add the Western-oriented focus amongst pro-Israel groups as a significant inhibiting 
factor, as China’s political and economic status was not yet fully appreciated.    
 
This is not to say that there were no individuals or groups with pro-Israeli sentiments operating 
in China at the time. In fact, many – largely from the United States and some of whom had 
cultural connections to China dating from the 1920s, 30s and 40s (the refugees of Harbin and 
Shanghai)
27
 – were arriving in the late 1970s as students, journalists, businessmen, and 
academics.
28
 Some of these individuals took on the role of middlemen facilitating the 
establishment of Sino-Israeli ties. Norman Kaplan, now the head of Calco Inc for instance 
paved the way for early academic and diplomatic contact between the two countries as early as 
1984 (and mostly via his Chinese acquaintance in Harvard.) In 1985, he successfully convinced 
the Chinese authorities to admit Israeli scholars seeking to join international conferences held 
in China.
29
  By 1988, Kaplan was trusted to the point where during a meeting with Chinese 
officials “he was informed that China now officially favored full diplomatic relations with Israel”, 
a message he was asked to personally communicate to Tel Aviv.
30
 His efforts have been 
recognised by both Israel’s President Chaim Herzog and the American President George Bush 
Senior.
31
 Another individual worth mentioning is the Austrian-born and one-time Shanghai 
refugee Shaul Eisenberg. An extremely wealthy businessman with interests in Japan and 
Southeast Asia, Eisenberg acted as the Mossad’s go-to-man in China as early as 1979, forging 
relations with the Chinese leadership and successfully arranging “a secret meeting between the 
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heads of the Israeli defense industry and Chinese defense leaders” which resulted in his 
company, the Israel Corporation, overseeing a $10 billion 10-year deal to modernise the 
Chinese military with re-exported Israeli and American hardware. The deal was authorised by 
the then Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin (and Henry Kissinger) as part of the larger 
containment strategy pursued against the USSR.
32
 
 
Other individuals – who mostly came with (or led, as was the case with Wendy Abraham who 
led the first official American tour group to Kaifeng in 1983, and Marvin Tokayer who still 
leads yearly Jewish themed tours to Japan and China)
33
 tour groups and the like (organised first 
by the China International Travel Service but later on by a myriad of companies offering 
‘Jewish Heritage Tours’ run jointly by Xu Xin and his partners in the US) – constituted an early 
important source of support and funding for Jewish academic initiatives and projects across the 
country.
34
 Initially, this was looked upon with suspicion by the authorities. In 1984, for example, 
the Foreign Affairs Office of the Henan provincial government in Kaifeng (where a sizable 
Jewish minority still resides) reportedly “advised officials that donations should be ‘turned 
down with grace’ if they were ‘religiously oriented or implied a Jewish nation’”. 35  Even 
displaying an academic interest on Jewish heritage sites was liable to bringing upon one the ire 
of the Chinese authorities.
36
 Inhibitions were soon dropped however, and solicitations for 
funding and support quickly became a normative practice especially following 1992. While it is 
likely that many of these individuals did not necessarily see their donations through the prism 
of advocacy, not only because most of the available channels open for funding were either in 
‘neutral’ Judaic academia or in historical heritage sites associated with the preservation of a past 
Jewish presence, but more importantly in that China itself was still a terra incognita for most of 
these people (i.e., many of these individuals were reportedly surprised to discover that there 
was interest in Judaism or an actual Jewish presence to begin with) there were certainly some 
who did associate their funding with the promotion of certain narratives that were, for the most 
part, explicitly pro-Israeli. For example, the Kaifeng Jewish community attracted and continues 
to attract a great deal of attention from visitors and groups ranging from those espousing a 
Messianic-Zionist theology seeking to convert ‘Jewish Chinese’ to Christianity, to those urging 
greater commitment towards Judaism and Israel from the members of the Kaifeng 
community.
37
 
 
Some of these individuals went beyond the simple provision of funds and emerged as 
advocates for Israel in academic contexts. Avrum Ehrlich, for example, an Israeli-Australian 
businessman originally came to China as a lecturer in the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. 
Later on, he was offered on a whim to give a course on Messianism in the Shandong-based 
Center for Judaic and Inter-Religious Studies in 2004, following which he was immediately 
given a full professorship.
38
 In a Haaretz article, he stated that one of the reasons behind his 
decision to come to China was that he “found there’s great disempowerment in Israel”, which 
led him to look “for a place where I could make a difference”. 39 Ehrlich apparently wrote 
several White Papers for the Israeli government advising it on its diplomatic outreach to China, 
and has been active in the past few years (particularly after leaving the Shandong Center) in 
promoting cultural and economic engagement through a number of bodies, including the Israel 
Chamber of Commerce in China and more recently the Israel-China Institute, which he 
heads.
40
 Dan Ben-Canaan, the director and founder of the Sino-Israel Research and Study 
Center in Heilongjiang University, also comes to mind as one of these many individuals.
41
 The 
centre, which he founded in 2002, was set up in order “to deepen the cultural, educational, 
social, and economic exchange between China, Israel, and Jewish People around the world” 
and “to assist the Chinese people in learning, understanding and creating a true realistic image 
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of the Jewish people”.42 The centre, it should be noted, is completely dependent on donations 
and foreign contributions and enjoys a working relationship with Bar Illan University.
43
 
 
Some organisations were also beginning to make early forays into China during this time. The 
Appeal of Conscience Foundation, founded and headed by the staunchly pro-Israeli Rabbi 
Arthur Schneier,
44
 and which describes itself as working “on behalf of religious freedom and 
human rights throughout the world” sponsored the first inter-faith delegation to China in 
1981.
45
 In addition to this, the Foundation “established exchange programs with the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing” and has since then “met with government and religious 
leaders from the Buddhist, Catholic, Moslem, Protestant and Taoist communities in Beijing 
and Shanghai to strengthen mutual understanding and cooperation”. 46 Rabbi Schneier himself 
was active in promoting Jewish cultural and academic initiatives (some of which will be 
mentioned below) and was reported to have played a major role in the restoration of the Ohel 
Rachel Synagogue in Shanghai.
47
 In 1998, he was appointed by President Clinton, as one of 
three other American religious leaders to initiate a dialogue on religious freedom with 
President Jiang Zemin and his government. Unsurprisingly, Israel was one of the issues 
repeatedly discussed during Rabbi Schneier’s many forays into China.48 A degree of advocacy 
work, especially prior to the consolidation of Sino-Israeli ties in the 1980s, would have been 
likely.
49
  
 
Another major organisation operating at the time was the Sino-Judaic Institute (SJI), which was 
founded by the Leo Gabow, an ‘amateurish anthropologist’ whose interest in Sino-Judaic issues 
“was sparked when he picked up a pamphlet on Jews in China at Jerusalem’s Israel Museum”.50 
Running an import-export pharmaceutical firm in Hong Kong in the 1980s, Gabow and his 
wife first visited Kaifeng in 1984. “Soon after, Gabow had gathered enough research and 
international contacts to form the Sino-Judaic Institute” which he founded in 1985 in Palo Alto, 
California. Mainly focused on researching and highlighting Jewish culture in China, the SJI has 
involved itself in a number of ventures including development of the Jewish Studies Institute in 
Henan University in Kaifeng, backing the creation of a Judaica wing in the Kaifeng Museum, 
supporting country-wide Judaic programmes (which it has accomplished by offering 
scholarships to Chinese students and faculty seeking to study in Israel and the US and 
supplying materials and books to interested partners), organising exhibitions on the Jewish 
communities of China, and publishing a periodic magazine on Sino-Judaica issues, called Point 
East. Some members of the SJI’s leadership have also expressed an interest in helping the 
Kaifeng Jews ‘re-discover’ their identities (a project which has attracted other groups like 
Kulanu) and combat the emergent ‘Christian’ influences within that community.51 The SJI lists 
several Chinese and Israeli scholars as part of its international advisory board, including some 
that have been already mentioned (Avrum Ehrlich) and others whose role will be more 
exhaustively examined below (Xu Xin, Pan Guang, Fu Youde, Zhang Qianhong, and Shalom 
Wald.).
 52
  
 
It should be noted that the SJI’s abovementioned academic activities did not really take off until 
after 1992, a year that marked the entry of many organisations into China and after which, 
according to Song Lihong “countless popular books about Jews were spawned and almost all 
academic centers were created”.53 Indeed, groups like the AJC, via its Asia Pacific Institute, and 
the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) only began their formal visits to China in the 90s, taking a 
heavy interest in establishing academic links (especially in areas concerning Sino-Israeli 
relations and Judaic Studies)
54
 and opening channels of communications with the country’s 
officials (the AJC even lobbied in favour of lifting trade restrictions placed on China following 
the Tiananmen massacre).
55
 Funding overall began to intensify and came from a variety of 
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sources, including “from Israel (government, industry, and the private organisation Igud Yotzei 
Sin, former Jewish residents of China,) and from American or other private foundations”.56  
 
Ultimately, and despite this flurry of activity from interested individuals and groups, it was 
Chinese scholars who were the main catalysts courting pro-Israeli funding and support into 
Chinese academia. The pioneering scholars of the 1980s and 1990s (i.e., the small group that 
opted to study Israel and its people) while deeply interested in Judaic and Biblical culture 
(which they saw as a foundational pillar through which to understand Western civilisation) as 
well as the state of Israel itself, lacked the fiscal means, let alone the basic foundational 
infrastructure, to pursue such areas of study. Turning to Israeli and Jewish-affiliated individuals 
and organisations for resources and materials was a natural outcome given the prevailing 
circumstances. Prior to 1992, these forms of outreach were formally discouraged by the 
authorities, although they were permitted due to their political utility in maintaining points of 
contact with Tel Aviv (so long as the ‘Israeli’ dimension was downplayed and the ‘Jewish’ one 
emphasised) and should be conceived as being part of the wider push, on the part of the 
Chinese political and academic elite, for more ‘openness’ and ‘objectivity’ in the study of 
Zionism and Israel (typified by initiation of the Hebrew language programme in 1985). After 
1992, when relations with Israel were formalised and taboos regarding the study of Israel and 
Judaism were partially lifted, overtures and solicitations on the part of Chinese scholars to such 
organisations grew tremendously as they began the process of creating an indigenous Judaic 
studies infrastructure in the country. Broadly speaking, these scholars can be divided into two 
groups, an informal activist group – typified by the likes of Pan Guang and Xu Xin,57 – and the 
Peking Hebrew language programme group, and around which China’s Judaic studies 
infrastructure began to emerge and a nascent ‘advocacy’ network coalesced around later on. By 
the early 21
st
 century, China possessed around ten centres dedicated to the study of Hebrew 
and Judaic studies largely due to the efforts exerted by these two groupings of scholars.
58
  
 
 
The Informal Activists 
Pan Guang is arguably one of the most influential Judaic scholars in China enjoying some form 
of political clout. Although he has retired from most positions, Pan Guang headed in the past a 
number of important bodies associated with the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) 
– a government-affiliated think tank – including the Shanghai Center for International Studies, 
the Institute of Eurasian Studies, and the Chinese Society of Middle East Studies, amongst 
others.
59
 Since the late 1980s, he has played a significant role in the promotion of Judaic and 
Israeli studies in China,
60
 organising a number of conferences (including the first Jewish studies 
conference in Shanghai in 1994 and more recently the First Young Scholars Forum on Jewish 
Studies in 2010).
61
 In 1988, he co-founded the Shanghai Judaic Studies Association (with Prof. 
Jin Ying Zhong, chief of the Center of Israel Studies) and helped inaugurate the (government-
funded) Center for Jewish Studies Shanghai (CJSS) under the aegis of the SASS.
 62
 The CJSS, 
which functions as an affiliated government think tank focusing on Israeli and Jewish research 
(with a particular bent towards the history of the Shanghai Jews,) is involved in a wide range of 
activities which include organising (national and international) academic conferences (such as 
the first ever Jewish studies and ‘Jews of Shanghai’ conferences both of which were held in 
1994) as well as so-called Rickshaw Re-unions bringing former Jewish refugees back to 
Shanghai, hosting Chinese and foreign scholars at the centre, sponsoring documentaries and 
language programmes (heavily involving the Israeli consulate in Shanghai) and actively 
publishing reports and studies on a variety of topics encompassing Sino-Israel relations, the 
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Jewish presence in China, contemporary Israel, the Holocaust, the peace process, and the 
global history of anti-Semitism.
63
  
 
Given the centre’s pioneering status as one of the earliest existing Chinese institutions dealing 
with Judaic and Israeli issues prior to the formalisation of ties with Israel, it has, unsurprisingly 
attracted a great deal of attention from Jewish organisations abroad. According to an AJC 
report issued in 1992, the CJSS had by then already established ties with a number of Jewish 
bodies including Brandeis University, Rabbi Schneier’s Appeal for Conscience, the Sino-Judaic 
Institute, Hebrew University’s Harry Truman Institute, the Institute for Zionism at Tel Aviv 
University, and the Jaffa Center for Strategic Studies, as well as the Wiesenthal Center. Many of 
these contacts were likely cultivated during Pan Guang’s early visits to the US and Israel.64 In 
1988, he spent time in Columbia University, New York University, and the Brookings Institute, 
and in 1989 met Rena Krasno in California (a major SJI member).
65
 In 1991, he was a visiting 
scholar of Jewish and Middle East studies at Hebrew University. The following year, he 
became a visiting scholar of International studies and Holocaust studies in Claremont Mckenna 
College and the Simon Weisenthal Center in Los Angeles respectively.
66
  
 
In the succeeding decades, the CJSS has marshaled an impressive list of contacts:
67
co-
sponsoring lectures and exhibitions with the Herziliya-based International Policy Institute for 
Counter-Terrorism, the International Security and Defense Systems Ltd (ISDS),
68
 the 
Interdisciplinary Center Hezliya (IDC), hosting delegations from the AJC Asia-Pacific Institute, 
the Conferences of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organisations, the Rabbinical 
Council of America,
69
 the ADL headed by Abe Foxeman, Ellen M. Heller President of the 
American Joint Distribution Committee, neo-conservative luminaries like Nathan Glazer, 
Abraham Cooperman from the Weisenthal Center
70
 as well as several Jewish American 
philanthropists (Rena Krasno of the SJI, the Jewish philanthropist Kathryn Davis, Lynn 
Schusterman, Chairwoman of the Charles and Lynn Schusterman Family Foundation) to name 
just a few. Many of these organisations and groups are defacto pro-Israeli in their ideological 
orientation, and while it would be unfair to suggest that Pan Guang’s views and attitudes, or that 
of the centre for that matter, are necessarily reflective of these views, it is worth noting that Pan 
Guang has been drawn into the networks of (ideological) knowledge production as a result of 
these connections. These include, for example, Pan Guang’s short-lived participation in Daniel 
Pipe’s Middle East Quarterly,71 or more disconcertingly, his participation in conferences hosted 
by the well-known Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the AJC’s International 
Relations Committee.
72
 
 
The CJSS also maintains ties with Israel through the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Israeli Embassy in Beijing, the consulate in Shanghai, several Israeli universities
73
 and media 
outlets like the Jerusalem post and Haaretz. The official links with Israel are certainly far more 
intimate than the listing would suggest – the 2006-2008 catalogue of events found on the CJSS 
website for instance reveals the existence of a robust and close partnership with the Israeli 
authorities. This is mainly expressed through the person of the Israeli Consul General in 
Shanghai who is repeatedly found paying “Dean Prof. Pan a visit”, arranging meetings with 
CJSS scholars on the Middle East in his own residence, and facilitating visits for Israeli MFA 
officials to the centre. More symbolically, the succession of Israeli leaders, including the likes of 
Yitzhak Rabin, Chaim Herzog, Ariel Sharon, and Shimon Peres, who have visited the centre 
through the years, pinpoints to its significance in the context of Israeli advocacy.
74
  
 
Xu Xin is another major figure in Chinese Judaic studies whose relationship to foreign 
advocacy circles is more clear-cut and earlier than that of Pan Guang. In 1985, when he was 
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teaching courses on modern American Jewish literature in Nanjing University, Xu Xin had 
encountered a Jewish American Fulbright scholar by the name of James Friend who had come 
to Nanjing to teach English. Friend apparently assisted Xu Xin to come to Chicago State 
University for two years, during which time he involved himself heavily, at the encouragement 
of the Friend family, in the surrounding Jewish community.
75
 At the conclusion of his stay, Xu 
Xin made plans to visit Israel in 1988 before returning to China. In order to raise funds for 
such a trip, and on the advice of the Friend family, he made an appeal to EL AL airlines and 
the Israeli consulate in Chicago. EL AL agreed to sponsor his flight and the Harry S. Truman 
Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at Hebrew University agreed to cover his 
expenses in exchange for lectures at the school on “Jews and Judaism through Chinese Eyes”.76 
The trip to Israel was ‘life-changing’, to say the least, as he himself states:  
 
With scant knowledge of Israel, I had no idea what I would see and was unable to 
predict the outcome of the visit. The result was a visit that changed my life and 
encouraged me to travel further down the road of Jewish studies, making my small 
contribution to the development of Sino-Israel ties. Since then Israel became a 
subject for my research and study, signifying an academic addiction to it as a country 
and as a people.
77
 
 
Upon returning to China, Xu Xin was already in the process of becoming an advocate for 
stronger links with Israel and the global Jewish community, arguing early on in favour of 
establishing diplomatic ties with Israel during a conference held on that very subject.
78
 In April 
1989, he went on to found the China Judaic Studies Association (different from the one 
founded by Pan Guang) with help from his American Jewish contacts,
79
 including Beverly 
Friend – the wife of James Friend – who would remain a life-long patron of his work.80 The 
Association’s goals were aimed at organising meetings on Jewish issues, holding seminars and 
public lectures and subsidising publications and awards for Chinese scholars researching Jewish 
topics (Pan Guang for example was a recipient of the James Friend Annual Memorial Award 
for Sino-Jewish Studies in 1993).
81
 More significantly, he began to lay down the foundations of a 
new academic centre dedicated to studying Judaic culture – and later on – religion. In 1990, 
drawing on funds from the American community, he made a dedication in Nanjing University 
Library to his friend, the late James Friend with what has become – according to Xu Xin’s 
supporters in the West – China’s largest collection of Judaica books. More significantly, in 
1992, he founded the Institute of Jewish Studies in Nanjing University, which was initially 
placed under the Foreign Literature Department due to Xu Xin’s literature background, but 
since 2003 has been placed under the Religious Studies Department.
82
 Students graduating 
from the institute have helped popularise Judaic studies across the country. For example, 
Zhang Ligang and Hu Hao – Xu Xin’s Ph.D students – both joined the Institute of Jewish 
Studies in Henan University (Kaifeng) founded by Zhang Qianhong in 2002 (more precisely 
after she became the Vice President of Zhengzhou University) and which reportedly receives 
funding and support from abroad (including from the SJI).
83
  
 
The institute, which would emerge to become one of China’s foremost centres in the study of 
Judaica and Hebrew, is completely dependent on foreign funds. This is by no means an 
exaggeration: as Xu Xin himself claims in a B’nai B’rith article: “[The Institute] depends 100 
percent on donations…for seminars, workshops, summer school…conferences and 
scholarships”.84 Without doubt, Xu Xin “had to become an experienced fundraiser to support 
his projects”. The Association was clearly one channel through which this funding and support 
came. Another source came from a wider US-based network which he began to cultivate 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s on his many journeys to the US and Israel, and which will 
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only grow in importance with time. His networks were likely formed through the lectures 
(which dueled as fundraising campaigns) he gave across the Midwest and other parts of the US 
in synagogues, Jewish centres, and groups like the ADL’s Hidden Child Foundation and the 
Birthright Israel Alumni Association on topics that “included ‘Israel through Chinese Eyes’, 
‘Kaifeng Jews’, ‘The Jewish Diaspora in Modern China’, and ‘Relations Between China and 
Israel’”. He also “served as [a] visiting scholar or speaker at Harvard University, Yeshiva 
University, Yale University, University of Chicago, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Bar-
Ilan University, Tel Aviv University, Haifa University, University of Pennsylvania, The UCLA, 
Stanford University, City University of New York, Northeastern University, Northwestern 
University, just to name a few, and various Jewish organisations and institutions across the 
United States”.85 His energetic networking – which brought him in close contact with many 
Jewish elite philanthropists, academics, and university heads who were quite eager to meet him 
– not only provided him access with further funding, but also allowed him to pursue further 
studies in Jewish-related subjects. During this time, he was invited to study at the Hebrew 
Union College in Cincinnati
86
 the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research in Columbia, and the 
Harvard Center for Jewish Studies, an integral training that allowed him to shift the focus of his 
institute away from ‘American Jewish literature’ towards a more expansive study of Judaica.  
 
Under the aegis of the institute, Xu Xin produced a considerable number of works on Jewish 
subjects including the Chinese Jews of Kaifeng (1995), Anti Semitism: How and Why (1996) 
[“distributed to university libraries throughout China, courtesy of grants from the Simon 
Weisenthal Center and the Canton (Ohio) Jewish Community”], 87  A History of Western 
Culture (2002), The Jews of Kaifeng, China: History, Culture, and Religion (2003), and A 
History of Jewish Culture (2006). In addition to that, he was approached by the Israeli 
embassy’s Cultural Attaché to edit a Catalogue of Chinese Books about Israel and Jewish 
culture. His most significant work however was the completion of a 1000-page Chinese edition 
of the Encyclopedia Judaica. Initially a self-funded project, Xu Xin eventually got hold of 
funding from the Sino-Judaic Center as well as several individual donors “from all over the 
world”88 after making a solicitation through The Jerusalem Post. He apparently went to Ulpan 
Akiva in Israel to improve his Hebrew in order to complete the project (during which time he 
also acted as a guide for American tour groups in Israel.) Following its completion, he 
presented a copy of the one-volume Chinese edition of the Encyclopedia Judaica to Ezer 
Weitzman, the President of Israel (he met two other former Presidents during that visit, as well 
as the Chinese Ambassador to Israel.)
89
 The Sino-Judaic Institute, through private donations 
collected from a philanthropic fund it administers, managed to distribute fifty copies of the 
Encyclopedia around China.
90
 A resounding success, revisions were made for a second edition 
soon after.
91
  
 
In addition to these publications, Xu Xin organised a number of exhibits and lectures in the 
university (which had received government approval) showcasing the history of Jews in China, 
Zionism, Jewish literature, the Kibbutz, etc. One particular exhibit was held in partnership with 
the Simon Weisenthal Center in 1993 under the title ‘The Courage to Remember: The 
Holocaust 1933-1945’. Interestingly, this exhibit (which attracted around 80,000 visitors in 
seven weeks) was mounted in the Nanjing Memorial Hall commemorating victims of the 
Japanese massacre, giving form to a repeated theme found in emergent Sino-Judaic scholarship 
linking the Holocaust and Nanjing Massacre narratives together.
92
 Many of these exhibitions 
attracted Jewish tour groups from the US and Europe, many of whom also provided donations 
to the institute. Interestingly enough, Xu Xin has “also acted as a National Guide for American 
groups touring Jewish sites in China” over the years, with all that entails in terms of networking 
and fundraising.
93
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The Institute also began to organise a number of conferences. In 1996 it coorganised with Tel-
Aviv University and the Hebrew Union College ‘The International Conference on Jewish 
Studies’ which was held in Nanjing and attracted more than 60 Chinese and Jewish scholars. In 
2002, 2004, and again in 2005 it held several more conferences and symposiums dealing with 
the history of the Jewish Diaspora in China, Judaism, and Jewish and Chinese experiences of 
the Holocaust and Nanjing Massacre. More significantly, the institute organised a number of 
three-week long summer workshops in 1997, 1999, and 2002.
94
 The aim of these workshops – 
which were largely run by Israeli and American scholars – “was to present reliable, 
unprejudiced and accurate information on Jewish history and culture to Chinese professors of 
world history or western civilization” who were interested in incorporating “relevant 
information into the courses they teach at their home institutions”.95 These workshops were 
supported by a number of largely American Jewish foundations dedicated to the promotion of 
Jewish culture and the arts, including the Samuel Bronfman Foundation, the Rothchild Family 
Foundation, the Lucius N. Littauer Foundation, the Skirball Foundation, the Memorial 
Foundation of Jewish Culture, and the Nathan Cummings Foundation.
96
  
 
It would be useful to look at how these workshops are organised. The one in 2002 – which we 
have detailed information on – brought in 48 participants, made up of 20 instructors from 17 
different institutions from across China, 16 graduate students doing their PhDs or MAs,
97
 and, 
apparently under a special arrangement, 12 Jewish descendants from Kaifeng “who consider 
themselves descendants, but who know very little about Jewish history and traditions” and 
wanted to know more.
98
 Although two Chinese professors – including Xu Xin – gave talks, the 
rest were given by lecturers who mostly came from the US and Israel (specifically from Bar 
Illan.) Coursework was intensive, and ranged from 6 to 9 hours every day, with an informal 
session held in the evenings during which video tapes were shown and a basic Ulpan (Hebrew 
class) were carried out. Outings and weekend tours were also arranged, and a variety of 
materials such as books, pamphlets and videos (a considerable number of which could be 
easily considered as propagandistic – ‘Israel: A Nation is Born’ ‘The Long Way Home’ and 
‘This is Israel’ – as well as several dealing with the history of anti-Semitism and Jewish religion – 
‘Seven Keys to Jewish Life’, ‘The Longest Hatred’, ‘Discover-Jews under the Wailing Wall’) 
were freely distributed amongst the participants.  
 
The lectures varied. One of the lecturers, Samuel Heilman, focused on what he described as 
the cyclical themes of Jewish civilisation – the motions of acceptance, exploitation, persecution 
and expulsion – which were defined through the two modes of exile and redemption. In the 
course of his lectures – tapping here into his 1999 workshop experiences – Heilman found 
himself wanting the Chinese students to “not simply understand but also emotionally connect 
with Jews”. 99 He did so by drawing comparisons “between the abiding desire for a Jewish 
homeland and the imperatives of sovereignty and the Chinese attachment to their homeland”, 
pointing out specifically to the Chinese experience and “their unwillingness to cede Chinese 
sovereignty over Sakhalin island or Taiwan might enable them to understand the Jewish 
attachments to parts of the West Bank”. 100 He also highlighted the similar historical traumas 
shared in the form of the “Rape of Nanjing” and the Holocaust, stressing in the meantime that, 
while appreciating these parallels, students “needed to recall that China was huge but the Jews 
were a tiny people, for whom these threats loomed even larger”. 101 More interestingly, the 
lecturer goes on to point out that Chinese and Jews – as living repositories of two ancient 
civilisations – both “confront a largely Christian Western civilisation that has not been prepared 
to value their culture and unique history.” Another lecturer gave a series of talks on the theme 
of the ‘Nation in Exile’ focusing on such issues as the Halahkic Rabbinic Judaism, its major 
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turning points, the influence of the Haskalae (Jewish enlightenment), emancipation, 
assimilation, anti-Semitism, the impact of economic development on Jewish migration, the 
emergence of national movements, the Shoah, and a short history of the state of Israel. The 
other lecturers were mainly focused on providing tailored material for the Kaifeng group, 
explaining religious rituals, giving Torah readings, and teaching them how to prepare for Jewish 
holidays, amongst other things.   
 
In 2002, and in recognition for Xu Xin’s tireless efforts in “establishing the academic 
framework for the teaching of Jewish history and culture in China, and for encouraging the 
development of Sino-Israel ties”, he was awarded an honorary doctorate by Bar Illan University.  
 
 
The Peking Hebrew Programme 
There are of course deeper educational roots to explore, as the article in Points East entitled 
‘The Hebrew Studies Program at Peking University, Beijing, China’ highlights. The authors, 
Meng Zhenhua and Chen Yiyi, provide an in-depth look at the early years of the programme’s 
development.
102
 According to the article, China’s first Hebrew language and cultural studies 
programme started in 1985 under the Department of Oriental Studies in Peking University and 
was, for the most part, initiated with security considerations in mind. The programme lacked 
the necessary resources to operate effectively with many of its early instructors being self-taught 
and lacking proper training in Modern Hebrew. This situation changed when the Chinese and 
Israeli Foreign Ministries in 1991 reached an agreement to help bolster the programme. In an 
early instance of low-key involvement from US Jewish organisations – an unnamed “U.S. based 
Jewish foundation”103 is noted to have provided the funds necessary to hire Israeli and US 
Hebrew instructors with Ulpan teaching experience and some of whom were “faculty members 
in Israeli universities, holding post graduate degrees in fields such as Hebrew linguistics, 
literature and education”.104 The Israeli embassy, according to the article, was heavily involved 
with the programme, distributing textbooks, inviting students to national celebrations and 
cultural performances, arranging for ambassadorial visits to the class and bringing in prominent 
Jews – like Shimon Peres – to speak to the students.  
 
The students who graduated from the programme played a number of important roles in the 
context of Sino-Israeli relations, working in places like the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
Shanghai International Studies University, the CJSS, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Xinhua News agency bureau in Jerusalem, the Israeli embassy in Beijing, as well as a number 
of Israeli and Chinese companies. More significantly, some of these students were instrumental 
in the expansion of Jewish studies in China, and in some cases, assuming the role of pro-Israel 
advocates. Ping Zhang, who graduated from the 1985 class, served as a counselor for the class 
of 1991. His advanced studies took him to Israel in 1993 where he eventually attained a PhD in 
comparative culture studies in 2000. He became a permanent resident of Israel and holds the 
post of Chinese language instructor at Tel Aviv University, running a relatively popular blog 
and weibo page dedicated to defending Israel from its detractors. Others include Chen Yiyi, 
who graduated in 1991 and studied Biblical studies in Cornell starting from 1994. Following 
that he returned to teach in Peking University in 2002. Another graduate of the programme, 
Meng Zhenhua set up a website and forum during his sophomore year in 2001 which was 
aimed at introducing Israel to the wider public and countering existing misperceptions about 
the state.
105
 On his fourth year, Meng went on exchange to Hebrew University, during which 
time he wrote columns for two Chinese newspapers describing his experiences there. In 2003, 
he graduated with a BA in Hebrew (and a philosophy minor), following which he commenced 
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his graduate studies leading to his PhD research in the Chinese University of Hong Kong. In 
2007, he joined the Institute of Jewish Studies in Nanjing University.
106
  
 
 
The Evolution of Academic Hasbra in the Diaspora and Israel 
In order to understand the subsequent growth and development of China-focused advocacy 
since the early 2000s (but more precisely near the end of that decade) one will need to examine 
some of the trends and changes that have affected US-bound Israeli advocacy (at the level of 
the state and the Diaspora) in the last decade.
107
 The changes in question are associated with 
what has been perceived – amongst Israeli organisations (not to mention the state itself) – as a 
delegitimisation campaign waged against the Jewish state (mainly at university campuses through 
the BDS (Boycott, Disinvestment, and Sanctions) and ‘Students for Justice in Palestine’ 
movements) coupled with an ‘image problem’ that has come to the forefront in wake of the 
Second Intifada (2001) the Lebanon War (2006) and the Gaza War (2009). In a wider sense, 
the need for a renewed hasbara thrust – utilising a variety of academic and political tools – 
stemmed from a recognition that Israel must recapture the grand narrative surrounding the 
state’s creation and its conflicts both within traditionally favourable parameters (i.e., the West) 
and increasingly within areas in which it has failed to establish a viable lobbying presence 
(emergent non-Western centres of power). At the crux of it is the hope of associating Israel 
with positive values (and negating emergent apartheid or conflict-based characterisations) which 
would in turn enable the state to defray international pressure and criticism about its actions. 
Understanding and appreciating these changes will hopefully serve to shed light on the reasons 
and motivations behind the involvement of such organisations and groups – which are largely 
American – in the Chinese academic space, and furthermore links their actions and models in 
the Chinese context to the experiences they already formed in the US.
108
  
 
According to Mitchell Bard – director of the Jewish Virtual Library and founder of the 
American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise (AICE) – the eruption of the second intifada in 2000 
led to the noticeable spike in anti-Israel activities within campuses across North 
America.
109
These manifestations of anti-Israel sentiment were compounded further by the 
perception – amongst pro-Israel advocates – of a long-standing “politicization of the study of 
the Middle East by professors who abused their positions to advance an anti-Israel agenda” and 
“present Arab views on Middle East history and their-usually sanitized-version of Islam”110 This 
politicisation has been largely attributed to both Arab funding (mainly Saudi) and, according to 
Martin Kramer,
111
 author of the 2001 book Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle 
Eastern Studies in America, to the influence of the late Columbia University Palestinian-
American Professor Edward Said, whose ‘ideology’ has meant that “Middle East Studies 
departments… are dominated by people who claim one cannot understand the Arab world and 
other Muslim societies unless one is an Arab or a Muslim”. 112  This has meant that such 
“departments, with a few exceptions, are rabidly anti-Israeli and cannot be trusted to give a fair 
view”. In 2003, the President of Brandeis University Jehuda Reinharz went even further with 
his ‘Call to Action’ wherein he warned about “the rise of anti-Zionist and anti-Israel sentiment 
on some university campuses”113 including “demands for disinvestment of university funds from 
companies doing business with Israel and a boycott of Israeli scholars”. This ‘Call to Action’ 
highlighted the need for “an ambitious agenda that would enable the American Jewish 
community to counter the intentional misinformation and demonization of Israel and Zionist 
history” through “the creation of first-rate, scholarly Middle East centers around the country” 
that would help “bring balance to the study of the Middle East on college campuses”.   
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These perceptions of bias against Israel in academia (and in a wider sense, public opinion at 
large) galvanised the Jewish community to take action on two levels. The first was an explicitly 
organisational response. In 2002 and under the auspices of the Charles and Lynn Schusterman 
Family Foundation, 33 major Jewish organisations and groups, including the AJC, AIPAC, 
ADL, the Jewish Virtual Library, the Simon Wiesenthal Center, and Hillel, came together to 
create the Israel on Campus Coalition (ICC.) According to their website, the ICC “empowers 
and expands the network of campus Israel supporters, engages key leaders at colleges and 
universities around issues affecting Israel, counters anti-Israel activities on campus and creates 
positive campus change for Israel”.
114
Additionally, it “offers information, resources, training, 
leadership opportunities, strategic advice and tactical assistance to the campus community and 
to national and international supporters of Israel on campus”.
115
 Similar groups, like 
StandWithUs, the David Project, and the Israel Project were also launched to complement and 
buttress the activities of the ICC, targeting students, scholars, and the wider public through 
media engagement.  
 
The second involved greater engagement on the part of Jewish philanthropists seeking to shape 
academic spaces in favour of Israel with the creation of Israel Studies Programs (ISP).
116
 A 2005 
Chronicle of Higher Education report makes note of this phenomenon, stating that American 
Jewish philanthropists “sought to counter what they see as a pro-Palestinian propagandist view 
of Israel by endowing chairs, centers, and programs in Israel studies”.
117
 The Charles and Lynn 
Schusterman Family Foundation – a major partner behind such initiatives as birthright Israel 
and the B’nai Brith Youth organisation as well as the ICC – spearheaded this trend with a 
massive $15 million endowment to Brandeis University (and an additional $15 million from 
other philanthropists) to create the Schusterman Center for Israel Studies in 2007, to be 
headed by Illan Troen.
118
 As the Chronicle report goes on to note, it was “the perception of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict on college campuses that led to the creation of [Prof. Illan] Troen’s chair 
at Brandeis”.
 119
 The centre builds on the experiences of the Brandeis University’s Summer 
Institute for Israeli Studies (SIIS) which was established in 2004 jointly by the school, the 
American Jewish Committee, and a group of Jewish philanthropists
120
 with the aim of 
“providing faculty with serious academic understanding of Israel and assistance in designing 
courses and curricula on Israel for their own universities”.
121
 
 
Illan Troen himself – a very important figure in Israeli academic advocacy – has repeatedly 
expounded upon the reasons driving the growth of Israel studies on US campuses, 
acknowledging in a 2004 interview on the right-wing Arutz Sheva website that there was a 
political dimension undergirding this trend that stems from “a recognition of the need to 
understand Israel better, of the growing hostility towards Israel in U.S. academy, the 
movements on campuses for boycott and divestiture, accusations that it is an illegitimate 
apartheid society”.122 In a 2006 Haaretz article ‘A Different Way to Fight Academic Boycotts’, 
Troen again emphasised that there was a strong link between the specter of academic boycott 
called on by supporters of the BDS movement and “the willingness of donors to give funds 
towards this cause”.123 His conclusions were substantiated by the findings of the ICC in a 2007 
report titled ‘In Search of Israel Studies’ wherein it was noted that “frequent complaints of 
hostility toward Israel within [Middle East study departments]… [have] stimulated the creation 
of Israel studies programs” 124  across the US in places like American University, Columbia 
University, Emory University, Georgetown University, the University of Maryland, the 
University of California, the University of Chicago, and New York University.
125
 
 
More recently, in 2012, the Charles and Lynn Schusterman Family Foundation created the 
Israel Institute to help “improve and expand the ways that modern Israel is taught, viewed and 
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appreciated in the United States and globally”.126 Headed by the former Israeli ambassador to 
the US, Itamar Rabinovich, the institute supports various cultural outreach initiatives, offers 
funding for doctoral and post-doctoral fellowships and faculty development grants “designed 
for professors who have some knowledge of Israel but not enough to teach a course” and gives 
scholars “an opportunity to travel to Israel, hone language skills, and take part in any other 
activities that will assist in developing and teaching Israel Studies courses”.127 Rabinovich has 
repeatedly stressed that the institute is “not a political advocacy group” and certainly without 
any “intention of lobbying”. 128 Rabinovich also states that “people can be critical of certain 
policies” regarding Israel “but the Jewish people are entitled to their own national ideology”.129 
 
According to Troen, donors have “zero” impact on the content of ISPs 130  – and Jewish 
philanthropists certainly “cannot dictate to an American university whom to hire”.131 It is often 
repeated that the purpose of such programmes is to engender a more objective understanding 
of Israel while avoiding coming off as pursuing too much hasbara.
132
 Despite these proclaimed 
efforts towards attaining some form of objectivity, there is indeed a tension between the desires 
of donors and the content of the programmes. Furthermore, some pro-Israeli advocates have 
raised issue with the risk of funding ‘Trojan Horse’ academics due to their lack of control, as 
was the case with the $5 million endowment given by the philanthropists Sanford and Helen 
Diller “for a chair to be filled by a visiting Israeli professor at Berkley” which ended up going to 
a “anti-Israeli academic”133 (Oren Yiftachel in this instance.) To circumvent these possibilities, 
many philanthropists turned to organisations like AICE (headed by the abovementioned 
Mitchell Bard) which work closely with groups like the ICC, Hillel, as well as Jewish 
philanthropists to bring in, through the Israel Scholar Development Fund, visiting scholars 
from Israel to the “top hundred schools, particularly those with a fairly large Jewish population”, 
encourage scholars to enter the field (supported mostly via the AICE-backed Schusterman 
Israel Scholar Awards), and more interestingly, “advice donors how to ensure that their 
universities do not misuse their investments”.134  
 
Simultaneously, the Israeli state also initiated its own re-branding campaigns. In 2005, the 
Israeli MFA, in close cooperation with the prime minister’s office and finance ministry, was 
reportedly involved in working out “a new plan to improve the country’s image abroad – by 
downplaying religion and avoiding any discussion of the conflict with the Palestinians”.135 The 
Jewish Week noted that the planned campaign was all about “fewer stories explaining the 
rationale for the security fence” and “more attention to scientists doing stem-cell research on 
the cutting edge or the young computer experts who gave the world Instant Messaging”.136 The 
initiative, dully dubbed ‘Brand Israel’ by the Israeli MFA, was launched formally in 2006. It 
was assigned around $4 million for the first two years of its existence with the purported aim of 
advancing several objectives ranging from the promotion of tourism and trade – through the 
showcasing of Israeli products – to the bolstering of Israel’s image abroad. 
 
Naturally, academic outreach – in the manner pursued by US Jewish communities –was quickly 
identified as an important conduit for such ‘re-branding’ efforts, but as a contested space linked 
with the struggle against the ‘delegitimisation campaign’ waged by Israel’s detractors. In 2010, 
the Israeli MFA held a conference focusing on the BDS threat (which was interestingly enough 
co-chaired by Mitchell Bard, of the signatories of the ICC’s ‘In Search of Israel Studies’ report, 
and a major figure in pro-Israel advocacy in the US. In the ‘Delegitmization of Israel’ workshop 
report, the centrality of academic advocacy in improving Israel’s image is easily discerned in its 
recommendations, which include “encouraging more Israel Studies on campus as part of a 
broader rebranding”. 137 The need for this style of advocacy was reiterated again by several 
reports issued by a number of Israeli government affiliated bodies and think tanks, including 
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one by the influential Reut Institute,
138
 ‘The Delegitmization Challenge’ (which argued for a new 
robust foreign policy initiative encompassing academic outreach in the form of Israel Studies 
Programs to counteract the so-called Delegitimization Network),
139
 and a working paper issued 
jointly by the MFA and the Israel Project in wake of the Herzilya Conference in 2010 ‘Winning 
the Battle of the Narrative: Strategic Communication for Israel’ (which forwarded the concept 
of “soft warfare” which included a ‘proactive public relations’ campaign that would “cover both 
the subject of Israel and its history, and the subject of radical Islam and the dangers it 
unfolds”.140  
 
The Netanyahu-led government has certainly taken these calls seriously. At the launch of the 
Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) report ‘Israel and the Jewish People: Geopolitics, 2012-
2013’, Netanyahu vowed to counter the ‘campaign of incitement’ against the Jewish state stating 
that “throughout a long period, efforts have been made, by the Israeli government as well as 
NGOs [non-governmental organisations] in Israel and all over the world, to counter this. 
However, in order to optimize these efforts, we need to improve coordination between various 
institutions active in this field, through a comprehensive action plan”. 141  The JPPI’s 
recommendations – which the prime minister had vowed to implement and support – 
primarily focused on cultivating PR connections abroad and energising public outreach of 
which academia was a significant component. During the President Conference held in June 
2013, Netanyahu met with a group of Jewish millionaires from whom he “sought to raise their 
money and use their connections for the war against the anti-Israel boycott movement”. 142 
More unusually, the Netanyahu government has also launched a programme under which 
students are eligible to receiving scholarships in exchange for making pro-Israeli comments on 
Facebook and Twitter.
143
  
 
 
China in the Discourse of Israeli Advocacy 
Having examined the ways in which US academia has been engaged as a venue for advocacy by 
pro-Israel constituencies, it would be useful to look at some of the explanatory discourses 
shaping the new ‘advocacy thrust’ targeting Chinese academia, especially given the yawning 
differences separating China academically, politically, and culturally, from its US counterpart 
(for instance, the BDS and de-legitimisation component is not particularly salient or pressing in 
China). This will help shed light on the rationale guiding advocacy, and highlight some of its 
goals, proposed methods and tactics that clearly seek to re-produce some of the models already 
being used in the US. One of the earliest reports
144
 of significance discussing China as a target 
for advocacy was published by the Jewish People’s Public Policy Institute or JPPPI (which was 
founded in 2002 by the Jewish Agency for Israel as an independent body and policy-clearing 
house for the Israeli government run by a board of directors chaired by Dennis Ross)
145
 in 2004 
as a 120-page strategy paper entitled China and the Jewish People: Old Civilizations in a New 
Era written by Dr. Shalom Saloman Wald (who, it should be noted, is also a board member 
and former chairman of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs). The report functions as a 
comprehensive dossier introducing China to Jewish policymakers, detailing not only the history 
of Sino-Judaic relations, but also the political and economic conditions within China, the 
perceptions of Jews within the wider public (one section displays the results of a questionnaire 
distributed amongst students attending Beijing Foreign Studies University), the history of the 
Kaifeng Jewish community and the state of Judaic scholarship, amongst many other topics.  
 
This examination is undergirded by Wald’s main point which is that the global Jewish 
community must engage comprehensively with a country that “will directly influence the fate of 
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the Jews” in the future. The practical outcome of this engagement is to “have China 
acknowledge the global challenges and regional dangers facing the Jewish people, and show 
awareness that China and the Jews may share major geopolitical concerns, internationally and 
regionally”. Shaping this outcome according to Wald are four ‘dynamics’ that the Jewish 
community must take into account when dealing with China. The first of these is the growing 
significance of Arab and Iranian oil to China’s economy, which reinforce pre-existing ‘pro-
Arab’ attitudes that must and should be challenged. The second is the supposedly tense 
relationship between Chinese Muslims and Han Chinese and increasing militancy of the 
former, a situation which offers new points of contact and cooperation with Israel. The third is 
the state of Sino-US relations, wherein Wald sees a possible role for the American Jewish 
community to play as a mediator and facilitator.
146
 The last is of course China’s own relationship 
with Israel and global Jewry, the state of which will be influenced by the three factors 
mentioned above, and will exercise its own influence on them in turn.  
 
According to Wald, the cultivation of Sino-Jewish relations (which subsumes Sino-Israeli 
relations) should be entrusted to the global Jewish community and not Israel, proposing that a 
“permanent delegation of World Jewry, maintaining relations with the appropriate Chinese 
government authorities and institutions, should help improve information flow between China 
and the wider Jewish world, as well as mutual understanding and cooperation”. This would 
certainly make it easier for the Chinese who “have hinted that it is sometimes easier for them to 
meet with international Jewish, rather than Israeli visitors”. The Diaspora, according to Wald, 
will function as a facilitator for Israeli interests in an environment that is politically apprehensive 
about any form of ‘open’ engagement with Israel due to both domestic and international 
considerations. The pro-Arab attitudes displayed by officials during the Intifada for example is 
identified by Wald as one area where Jewish organisations could play a role in helping Israel,
147
 
especially since the Chinese authorities might “consider concerns about the Chinese media 
more willingly if non-Israeli Jewish leaders rather than Israelis themselves expressed them”.148  
 
The main task of these Jewish organisations according to Wald is to lay down the foundations 
and infrastructure that would ultimately guarantee them the ability to exercise influence on 
Chinese policymaking, and particularly on issues of ‘existential concern’ to the Jewish people 
and Israel. At present, “Jewish policy responses to Chinese opportunities and interest have 
been insufficient. There has been a shortage of vision, information, coordination and 
money”.149 Rectifying this will mean adopting a mix of policies that would “include approaches 
to decision makers and communication with scholars and students, members of future elites – 
as well as with a broader public”. Such outreach would encompass such activities as the holding 
symposiums for Chinese policymakers and Chinese business leaders, public exhibitions, Jewish 
film festivals, offering training courses for university teachers, opening an academic Judaism 
centre in Beijing, supporting scholars and students, funding publication/translation efforts, and 
TV documentaries, amongst many other possible ventures. It is clear from this list of proposed 
recommendations (the “cost-effectiveness” of which “is likely to be high; Chinese salaries and 
costs, including inland airfares are still very low” with around $1 million being an initially 
sufficient fund to cover most expenses),
150
 that support for Judaic and Middle Eastern studies 
constitutes a central component in the success of any effective advocacy strategy towards China.  
 
This is only to be expected given that, as Wald himself notes, “there are enough signs that 
China’s leaders will increasingly listen to the expert advice of their scholars”. Indeed, Wald 
devotes a section of his paper to discussing the academic landscape in China and the relative 
balance of power between its various centres (the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the 
major universities) highlighting those with ‘access’ to policymaking circles as well as those 
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seeking to “build up their competence in Middle Eastern studies among others, but have 
financial constraints or difficulties in finding top quality specialists” 151  – likely with Jewish 
philanthropists in mind. Fostering links with these various academic spaces is necessary, 
although Wald stresses that “Beijing is the ‘weak link’ that needs to be strengthened” given its 
proximity to the centres of power.
152
 
 
The report is instructive with regards to the narratives it hopes Jewish academic advocacy will 
introduce to China. At the heart of these narratives is the looming ideational threat of anti-
Semitism to Israel, and the linking between such sentiments with anti-Zionist attitudes. This is 
immediately followed in significance with the narrative of Islam as being quintessentially 
‘troubled’ and locked in an antagonistic relationship with Chinese civilisation (this is largely the 
formulation of Raphael Israeli – a colleague of Wald in the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs 
– and a prolific writer on the Hui Muslim community). 153Indeed, ‘fundamentalist Islam’ is 
presented as a nascent threat to China and its people, with Asia emerging as a ‘battleground for 
the global Jihad’ (drawing here on the words of Pablo Tittel, a Legacy Heritage fellow at the 
Jerusalem Center Of Public Affairs).
154
 Underlying this narrative are two key issues that Wald 
seeks to underline: (1) the desire to frame the Israeli-Arab conflict as one rooted in religious 
antagonism,
155
 and (2) that Chinese Muslims are potentially a source of instability for the 
country. Arguably, the promotion of this narrative serves to undercut one of the cultural ties 
connecting China with the Arab world by way of problemitising it (Xinjiang, religious 
persecution, Salafism, etc.) and fostering in turn a shared ‘sense’ of unity between Israel and 
China as victims (i.e., similar suicide bombing traumas) and contenders with such ‘threats’. On 
another level, these narratives work to minimise the voice of Chinese Muslim communities 
which continue, according to Wald, to “harbor an old or new hostility to Zionism” of a 
problematic nature to pro-Israel advocates in China.
156
  
 
According to a Jewish Daily Forward article, Shalom Wald’s report “drew heavily on Xu [Xin’s] 
expertise”.157 This is not at all surprising given first the detailed nature of the report itself, and 
secondly, the shared attitudes both men have displayed for a more comprehensive and 
revamped relationship between Chinese academia and the global Jewish community. The same 
piece notes for example that “Xu said he hopes… major Jewish organizations will recognize the 
long-term importance of establishing contacts in Chinese society beyond the government level, 
particularly in reaching out to Chinese scholars”.158 These academic ties are clearly presented as 
channels through which a more enduring political relationship can be established. As Xu Xin 
himself again states “If you have a better foundation, you can stand any kind of shocks. I hope 
people in empowered positions realize it” (author’s emphasis).159 This is not to say that Xu Xin 
shares Wald’s political goals or has necessarily influenced or shaped the narratives Wald seeks 
to propagate, but the connection between these two men suggests the existence of a reinforcing 
strain within Chinese scholarly discourses about the Middle East and Islam that should be 
explored further.  
 
Since publishing this report in 2004, Wald has continuously advocated for greater and more 
proactive engagement with China’s academic community.160 In 2008, thus, the JPPPI organised 
the first annual conference commemorating the birthday of Shimon Peres entitled ‘Facing 
Tomorrow’. The conference purported to “examine what the future holds for the global 
community, the Jewish people, and the State of Israel” whilst also focusing “on Jewish and 
Israeli contributions to humanitu”.161 Unsurprisingly, China was one of the areas of interest in 
the conference, with speakers including Zhang Ping,
162
 Zhang Qianhong,
163
 Fu Youde,
164
Zhong 
Zhiqing,
165
 Rabbi Marvin Tokayer,
166
 and of course, Shalom Wald.
167
 In his talk, Wald reiterated 
the reasons that led him to write his report and why engagement with China was such a pressing 
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matter. He stressed that Chinese elite and students were very open at this juncture in time and 
“can be influenced”, as he puts it. He appraised current Jewish efforts in China as ‘miserable’, 
‘pathetic’, and scattered (he notes that he himself wrote ten proposals since publishing his 
report, and points to Rabbi Marvin as an example of some of the activist individuals working in 
China). Chinese efforts towards the study of Judaism are great, but remain smaller than 
Switzerland’s in terms of infrastructure. A great deal could be done if more funding was 
available, remarking that “among the 2000 people in this conference, there are a fair number of 
Jewish multi-millionaires”. 168  These basic outlines were again regurgitated in a JPPI 2010 
Annual Assessment chapter dealing with China and India, as well as in a 2012 Op-Ed Interview 
Series for Arutz Shevaentitled ‘China, Israel and the Jewish People’ wherein he states:  
 
Those who will rule China twenty years from now are presently studying in elite 
universities. If someone teaches them about Judaism and Israel, this will be good for 
the Jewish people. Eventually, when some of these students are in important positions, 
they are likely to advise their country’s leaders on Jewish and Middle Eastern issues.169 
 
Another important memorandum, this time published by the Institute for National Security 
Studies in Tel Aviv and titled Sino-Israeli Relations: Current Reality and Future Prospects, is 
also worth noting.
170
 Drawn up in 2009 by Aron Shai, a distinguished China scholar and Asian 
studies rector in Tel Aviv University, the monograph supplies a general overview of China’s 
socio-economic and political transformation, the history of Sino-Israeli ties and the long-term 
impact of China on Israel’s geopolitical position. The report’s main purpose is to goad Israeli 
decision makers into making a ‘correction’ in the way they approach Beijing, and a greater and 
more expansive utilisation of diplomatic tools that would help improve ties between both sides 
(for instance in the area of UN cooperation). While certainly not focused on Chinese academia 
persay, the report does forward a number of recommendations that echo Wald’s own calls for 
advocacy. These include taking “concrete steps in order to strengthen pro-Israeli sentiments 
prevailing among Chinese intellectuals and within wide circles of the Chinese public”,  171 and 
approaching “potential young promising cadres likely to become China’s next reservoir of 
leadership both at the national and regional levels”. 172 In addition, “informal academic contacts 
with various quarters in Beijing should be strengthened” and “trial balloons should be sent out 
aimed at emphasising to the Chinese public and emerging decision makers that some Israeli 
scholars and independent strategic thinkers maintain that a new and different China policy 
should be adopted by the Israeli government”. 173 One can moreover identify similar strains of 
the narratives promoted by Wald in the monograph, although they are presented outside the 
parameters of an academic context and more as ‘areas’ within which Sino-Israeli relations can 
grow. For instance, both countries according to Shai face similar challenges typified by the self-
determination claims of their own minorities – the Tibetans and Xinjiang Muslims with regards 
to China, and the Arab Palestinians with Israel. This linkage by Shai (and certainly by many 
other Israeli scholars and academics)
174
 carries with it a political hedge as it seeks to defray the 
illegitimacy of Israel’s position by highlighting an assumed similarity with China’s own political 
arrangements. Accordingly, if China chooses to criticise “Israel for opposing self-determination, 
what is there to prevent foreign countries and institutions from supporting China’s Muslim and 
Tibetan minorities should they demand the same?”. As such, terrorism and the threat posed by 
fundamentalist Islam emerge as key elements in this narrative.
175
 
 
Maturing Hasbara and Growing Advocacy: The 2000s to the Present 
 
By the mid-2000s, and likely in conjunction with developments occurring in the US, pro-Israel 
advocates began to increase their activities and funding throughout China, although the 
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acceleration of this trend would have to wait until 2009-2011, when Sino-Israeli relations began 
to show signs of a turn-around and political sensitivities over the teaching of Israel were 
overcome. This new phase in advocacy is not to be understood as a disjunction from the past, 
but rather as a new synthesis merging between the new ‘political energisation’ of the global 
Jewish community (and a growing awareness within this community of the importance of non-
traditional arenas like China) and the past buildup of infrastructure and networks cultivated in 
China over the last two decades. This new phase in advocacy, largely headed by foundations 
and philanthropic groups, was developed in three ways: [1] donations and endowments were 
now more frequent, larger and more ‘targeted’ in nature; [2] pro-Israel foundations and groups 
involved in China were increasingly becoming more organized; and, [3] the study of Israel, in 
addition to traditional areas of study such as Judaism and Hebrew culture/language, was now 
more actively and openly promoted by such groups within the context of academia.  
 
At the helm of these developments is the Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation, a 
philanthropist organisation founded by the real estate mogul Guilford Glazer.  Described by 
the Jewish Journal as a “staunchly pro-Israel former chair of Israel Bonds, a friend and 
confidant to every prime minister since David Ben-Gurion”,176 Guilford Glazer’s ideological 
sympathies are reflected in the commitment of the Glazer Foundation in supporting activities 
that promote and engender ties with the state of Israel, including for example Pepperdine 
University’s Jewish Institute. The Foundation established an early presence in China sometime 
around 1995 when the Glazers happen to meet with Xu Xin, the head of the aforementioned 
Jewish Studies Institute in Nanjing.
177
 While they are reported to have given some funding to 
Xu Xin’s institute during that time, it was not until 2006 that they supplied a major donation, 
largely in response to the Xu Xin’s call in 2001 for further funding to be earmarked for the 
construction of a modern quarter. The institute was renamed the Diane and Guilford Glazer 
Institute of Jewish Studies as a result.
178
 In 2008, the foundation made another considerable 
donation worth $100,000 to the institute,
179
 which coincided with another significant 
endowment given to the institute by the UK-based Exilarch Charitable Foundation to establish 
a ‘Naim Dangoor’ Fund for Universal Monotheism Studies under a new programme which 
would “enhance the Institute’s research and teaching of the core concepts of three monotheistic 
faiths: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam”180 and, more significantly its “ability to collaborate with 
other institutes” including Bar Illan, where a Dr. Naim Dongoor for Universal Monotheism 
Program already exists.
181
 In 2011, a delegation from Nanjing University flew to London to 
honour Naim Dangoor for his support of “their country’s burgeoning programme of Jewish 
studies” during which Dangoor “was made a consultant professor of China’s Nanjing University 
in award ceremony held in his Kensington apartment”. 182  In 2012, it was reported by the 
Nanjing University website that the Foundation invested $1 million to establish a ‘Nanjing 
University-Glazer Endowment Fund’ coinciding with the 110th anniversary of the university. 
While the funds were clearly allocated to “support the future development of the Institute of 
Jewish Studies” the donation apparently entailed the university to accede to an agreement that 
will make sure that it “will perform its duties… and enhance its influence in the field of Jewish 
and Israel studies” over the future ten years or even longer”.183 It should be noted that since this 
endowment the official name of the institute has been rendered into The Diane and Guilford 
Glazer Institute of Jewish and Israeli Studies, signaling a new direction in the institute’s 
academic work, which has traditionally been limited – given its official affiliation with the 
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies – to the study of Judaism and the Bible.  
 
Given all this, it is not exactly clear whether the Glazer Foundation had originally sketched out 
a plan outlining the scope and extent of its activities in China. If anything, its association with 
Nanjing appears to have been borne from sheer coincidence,
184
 although its initial hesitancy 
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about China appears to have been replaced by a more consolidated ‘adoption’ of the Nanjing 
Institute with greater stress now increasingly being placed on the study of Israel and the 
promotion of “soft diplomacy”.  In part, this may have been due to the growing recognition of 
China’s importance to Israel. According to one of the representatives of the foundation, the 
decision of the director to grant funds (earmarked for disaster relief) during the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake, reflected a new ‘strategic thinking’ with regards to China. In other ways, the 
strengthening of academic ties may have also been due to the influence of Seth Garz, the China 
Program Advisor of the Charles and Lynn Schusterman Foundation, who had been apparently 
advising and helping the Glazer Foundation in its China operation for a number of years.
185
 The 
Schusterman Foundation, while a relative late-comer, has also begun to play a major role in 
pro-Israel advocacy there, utilising its own experiences in the US to its advantage.  
 
Thus, in 2009, the Schusterman Foundation, drawing “on the paradigm of the Summer 
Institute for Israel Studies, a project of the Schusterman Center for Israel Studies at Brandeis 
University”,186 ran two workshops organised by Illan Troen and Seth Garz.187 The workshops, 
both focusing on Israeli studies, were held in Peking University and Shandong University and 
were primarily taught by Israeli scholars and academics.
188
 The Peking workshop, entitled ‘2009 
Summer Workshop on Modern Israeli Society’ (July 2009), was hosted by Chen Yiyi’s 
Program of Hebrew Language and attracted around “thirty to forty participants from academia, 
think-tanks, and journalists with a focus on modern Israeli society”. The Shandong University 
workshop, entitled “2009 Summer Workshop of Israeli Intellectual and Cultural Tradition” 
(July 2009) was hosted by the Center for Judaic and Inter-Religious Studies, headed by Fu 
Youde, who had already visited Brandeis University in 2008.
189
  According to the Schusterman 
website, the contacts made during these two workshops in 2009 resulted in (1) the Peking 
University Academic Committee approving and seed-funding “an Institute for Hebrew and 
Jewish Studies and elevated the status of the Hebrew Language Program”;190 (2)  the signing of a 
Memorandum of Understanding between Shandong University and Tel Aviv University to 
establish an exchange programme; and (3) the publication of “an unprecedented compilation 
of academic articles on Israeli politics, Zionist history, and Israeli society” 191 in Chinese. In 
2010, the Schusterman Foundation organised another four-day workshop in Shanghai Jiaotong 
University (SJTU) that aimed to “provide a thorough ‘orientation’ to Israeli history, culture and 
politics for [a] distinguished group of 35 academics, policy makers, government advisors and 
journalists in attendance”.192 The Shanghai seminar was likely enabled through Chen Yiyi, who 
heads the Peking Hebrew Language Program but is also involved in SJTU. Ten participants in 
the seminar (again headed by Chen Yiyi) were taken in January 2011 to Israel on a six-day 
study tour co-sponsored by the Schusterman Foundation, the AJC-backed Project 
Interchange,
193
 and the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
194
 The tour’s schedule included 
meetings with Israeli politicians, Knesset members, and senior representatives from Tel Aviv 
University and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In addition, the delegation traversed 
“much of Israel, including Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, the Northern border and the Dead Sea for a 
first-hand look at Israel ‘beyond-the-headlines’”.195 
 
The expressed rationale behind the hosting of these various seminars echoes closely those 
found in Aron Shai and Saloman Wald’s works. As stated in the Schusterman Foundation 
website, there is a clear need for greater engagement in an increasingly important country which 
“despite the concerted effort of a handful of dedicated Chinese scholars of Jewish subjects”, 
still suffers from “misinformation about Jewish and Israeli history”.196 The seminars offer a way 
to rectify this misinformation and, more significantly, to open a dialogue with those whom 
Sanford R. Cardin, President of the Schusterman Family Foundation identified as having “a 
direct hand in shaping Chinese policy toward the Middle East”.197 Such seminars moreover 
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offer a pathway for improving Sino-Israeli relations via the efforts of the American Jewish 
community.
198
 Furthermore, they lay down the foundations for a more concentrated Israeli 
advocacy in China characterised by the implementation of Wald’s more difficult 
recommendation, the creation of a Sino-Israeli Studies Center in Beijing. As the website 
declares regarding the vision for future programming, “establishing a dedicated Israel Studies 
center at Peking University, new fellowships to bring Chinese scholars to do research in Israel 
and Israeli scholars to teach in China, ongoing efforts to provide quality translations of Jewish 
and Israeli classics, and academic delegations to tour Israel” are major priorities, with the 
overall aim of creating “a vital cultural and intellectual connection between Chinese and Jewish 
and Israeli communities”.199 
 
This is not to say that the Schusterman Foundation’s activities did not encounter any resistance 
or opposition. After all, while there were noticeable improvements in Sino-Israeli relations, the 
political environment still militated against ‘open’ discussion of Israel in academic settings. This 
likely explains the initial reluctance and heightened scrutiny expressed by the authorities and 
university administration towards the holding of such workshops, and particularly under the 
term ‘Israel’. 200   Concerns over hasbara were also apparently shared by Chinese scholars 
themselves. A Jewish Telegraphic Agency article noted that while the Chinese Islamic and 
Persian scholars attending the seminar were “impressed by the efforts to present balanced views 
on Israel”, they had apparently expressed concern beforehand “about bias from the all-Jewish 
cast of lecturers from abroad”. 201  Interestingly enough, the ‘balanced’ presentation was 
attributed more to an ‘accidental strategy’ of bringing in “a more liberal-leaning group of 
American and Israeli academics”.202 Seth Garz acknowledges in the same article that “we didn’t 
want the seminar to be too much hasbara… but academics tend to be more liberal anyway”. 
 
These various Schusterman and Glazer-backed initiatives eventually paved the way for a more 
organised and coherent policy of engagement on the part of these same organisations and 
groups in the form of the Sino-Israel Global Network and Academic Leadership (SIGNAL), 
which was formed, according to the official website, to help “create a broad-based academic 
framework that will foster long-term alliances between Israel and China”.203 More specifically, 
this organisation aims to engender a real shift in Chinese political and cultural attitudes about 
Israel by pursuing an elite-centred form of advocacy with academic networks linked to key 
decision makers in the Chinese government whilst also “rectifying” the damage done by 
China’s “50-year-old network of affiliations throughout the Arab world and Iran” which has led, 
according to the organisation’s assessment, to serious misunderstandings on the part of the 
Chinese leadership of Israel and the region as a whole.
204
  
 
Officially, SIGNAL was founded in 2011
205
 by Carice Witte, an Israeli Yale University graduate 
with “a 20-year entrepreneurial career in Israeli high-tech and international real estate”.206 In 
reality, the organisation was born from a collaborative, interpersonal network of activists, 
foundations, and think tanks already involved in China with some degree of input and support 
from the Israeli government as detailed in a talk given by John Fishel, a consultant for the 
Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation, during the March 2013 Jewish Funders Network 
International Conference panel on Sino-Israeli relations.
207
 According to Fishel, the idea for 
SIGNAL was first contemplated when he met Carice Witte in Israel a few years back. This led 
to discussions with Sandy Carden, President of the Charles and Lynn Schusterman Foundation, 
through which Fishel met with Seth Garz (which implies that plans for SIGNAL were likely 
formulated some four or five years back in 2006/2007 or thereabouts). Discussions and 
informal meetings soon followed and several “China 101” information seminars were held with 
representatives from the Israeli government to help inform donors and philanthropists 
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interested in China.
208
 These networking sessions explain to some extent the profusion of actors 
and groups supporting and backing SIGNAL’s mission in China. According to SIGNAL’s 
booklet,
209
 the organisation is affiliated to a broad number of Israeli-based universities, 
American and Israeli think tanks (including the neoconservative Hudson Institute and the 
American Enterprise Institute) as well as clearly advocacy-oriented groups like the Lawfare 
Project, the Israel Project, and the AJC’s Project Interchange. In addition, SIGNAL “works 
closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli embassy in Beijing, as well as the Israeli 
consulates in Shanghai and Guangzhou to enhance China’s and Israel’s strategic, diplomatic, 
cultural and economic relationship through academia”. 210  The Israeli Ministry of Strategic 
Affairs is also designated as an affiliate. While donors are not identified in the SIGNAL 
booklet, the listed ‘foundations’ are likely the main providers for funding. Of these, the Lynn 
and Charles Schusterman Foundation and the Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation were 
involved in the early deliberations over the founding of SIGNAL, and major players in pro-
Israeli advocacy in China as noted above. Other likely donors on the list include the Newton 
and Rochelle Becker Family Foundation, and the Klarman Foundation, both of which fit easily 
within the prism of pro-Israel advocacy, and in some respects, are more aggressive than the 
Schusterman and Glazer Foundations in their promotion of Israel and the perceived challenges 
it faces. The Becker Foundation for example was found to be one of the seven major funders 
of the Islamophobia network in the US according to a seminal study conducted by the 
American Center for Progress.
211
 Likewise, the Klarman Foundation has been a long-time 
backer of so-called “anti-Islamist” groups such as the Middle East Media Research Group and 
the Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting, the first dedicated to exposing so-called 
ties between “American Muslims and extremist Muslim movements” and the second “devoted 
to combating what it sees as anti-Israel bias in the media”.212 The Klarman Foundation has also 
backed a number of ‘advocacy’ projects – some of which have been already mentioned – such 
as the David Project and the Israel Project. According to some reports, it has also been 
implicated in funding Jewish settler groups in the West Bank.
213
  
 
The Board of Academic and Expert Advisors
214
 reflects an even wider constellation of 
individuals and groups involved in SIGNAL, and some of whom we have already encountered 
in the context of advocacy promotion in China, including Gal Luft, co-director of the Institute 
for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS), senior member in the US Energy Security Council, 
co-chair of the Set America Free Coalition, founding member of the Institute for Renewable 
Energy Policy, the International Lithium Alliance, OurEnergyPolicy.org and Citizens for 
Energy Freedom amongst many others.
215
 Uriel Reichman (President of the Interdisciplinary 
Center, Herzliya), Moshe Kaveh (President of Bar Illan), Aron Shai (Rector of Tel Aviv 
University), Amos Nadai (former Ambassador of Israel to China), Shalom Wald (Director of 
JPPPI), Ephraim Inbar (Director of the Begin-Sadaat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar Illan) 
Adam Cole (affiliated with AIPAC and the ADL) and Jim Bursis (former Director of the AJC’s 
Asia Pacific Institute) to mention just a few. A few Chinese scholars, like Chen Yiyi, Ma 
Xiaolin,
216
 and Pan Guang are also listed as part of the board. More interestingly, and perhaps 
indicative of its ideological orientation, the organisation claims amongst its ‘supporters’ Henry 
Kissinger, Bernard Lewis, and a slew of IDF heads. 
 
SIGNAL started its operations in China sometime around mid-2010 during which it 
“conducted research showing that Chinese misconceptions about Israel and the Jewish people 
abound” and probed “China’s interest in high-level academic interchanges with Israel”. It also 
sent out ‘feelers’ to see what was, and was not feasible to do in the current environment, with an 
eye on establishing Israel Studies Programs (ISPs) at Chinese universities.
217
 The Sichuan 
International Studies University’s Center of Judaic and Chinese Studies was apparently the first 
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institution to show interest in these proposals. However, Fu Xiaowei, the director of the centre 
was “advised by more experienced and politically connected scholars that just making such a 
request could shut down the center. If there was interest in Israel Studies, it should be done 
quietly, without any formal acknowledgment”. 218  To facilitate the development of this ISP, 
SIGNAL apparently “coordinated the first contact between the municipality of Chongqing and 
Israel’s Embassy in Beijing”,219 which allowed, in addition to smoothening the political waters 
for the ISP, for first Israel Business Forum to be held in Sichuan. In addition to these early 
attempts at promoting ISPs, SIGNAL sought to arrange a Sino-Israeli symposium which was to 
be held in the US. The reason for this choice of location is that “high-level and influential 
Chinese academics and experts” indicated that they “would not come to Israel for such an 
event, nor would they host one in China” due to political reasons.220 Nothing came of this 
venture.  
 
Things began to change dramatically in late 2010 as Sino-Israeli relations began to improve and, 
in some respects, regain the strategic significance lost following the US-Israel-China arms 
imbroglio a decade earlier. This was most clearly expressed when the Chinese Communist 
Party reached out to the Likud and invited MK (Member of the Kenneset) Yuli Edelstein to 
participate in a ‘think tank conference’ held that year. According to Carice Witte, “the 
significance of this development lay in China’s most powerful political body expressing formal 
interest in Israel’s political echelons in a public fashion”.221 SIGNAL christened the dissipation 
of official concerns over Israeli advocacy by holding the first annual China-Israel Strategy and 
Security Symposium in September 2011. Co-hosted with the Lauder School of Government’s 
Center for Global Strategic Research (GLORIA) and the International Center for Counter-
Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya (IDC), the SIGNAL-backed conference 
brought together “leading scholars and influential analysts and former military and diplomatic 
experts from the Chinese and Israeli academia and community”. 222  Discussions revolved  
around “sensitive issues of foreign policy”, encompassing such topics as “bilateral counter-
terrorism approaches, the spread of radical Islam, responses to revolutionary upheavals in the 
Middle East, ‘other nation’ interference in China-Israel bilateral relations, new strategies for 
natural resource exploitation in the Middle East and the influence of China’s foreign policy 
planning within the context of its economic development”. 223  One panel even sought to 
“examine the shared implications of lawfare for the nations of Israel and China”. 224  The 
symposium was concluded with an “agreement by scholars on both sides to continue the 
dialogue to gain greater shared understanding”. 225   
 
More importantly, and as part of its core mission, SIGNAL has actively promoted the 
development of ISPs in the country’s major universities. Building on a pre-existing Judaic 
studies infrastructure, a more permissive political environment, and capitalising on the fiscal 
needs of Judaic and Middle Eastern departments, not to mention a genuine interest in Israel 
and Jewish culture, SIGNAL has been hugely successful in attaining its goals.
226
 During 2011-
2013, the organisation created six ISPs of varying levels of development, the first of which was 
in Henan University in Kaifeng (also the first SIGNAL ISP to be awarded Area Studies funding 
for Israel), followed by SISU in Chongqing (where the earliest overtures were made), then 
Shanghai International Studies University (SHISU), Shihezi University in Xinjiang, Yunnan 
University’s School of International Studies, and in Xi’an Northwest University’s Middle East 
Studies department. There are also ‘budding’ ISPs elsewhere: Renmin University has hosted 
SIGNAL lecturers for a full academic year, with signs that an ISP might be established there, 
which would “set an important example for other universities across the country and send a 
message to China’s leadership that Israel Studies is a valuable academic pursuit”.227 The Beijing 
Foreign Studies University,
228
 the China University of Petroleum,
229
 the Beijing Language and 
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Culture University,
230
 and the Beijing Foreign Affairs University,
231
 have also begun to 
collaborate with SIGNAL. Tsinghua and Peking Universities (the MIT and Harvard of China 
respectively) have also been eyed by SIGNAL (which is likely building on the earlier 
Schusterman ventures there).
232
 According to SIGNAL’s publications, there are currently six 
ISPs with a further five under development, bringing the total number of SIGNAL-sponsored 
ISPs in China to eleven as of the summer of 2013.
233
 The Nanjing Institute is not included 
within this group despite the Glazer Foundation’s involvement in SIGNAL.  
 
The amount of resources and networks SIGNAL has brought to the development of these 
ISPs is staggering. Examining SISU’s ISP is perhaps illustrative in that regard. SIGNAL 
inaugurated the programme in 2011 with an Israeli studies research paper competition for 
students officiated by Israel’s Ambassador to China, Amos Nadai, now an annual event 
attracting anywhere between 70 to 150 entries.
234
 These competitions – now reproduced across 
the country (and usually good indicators as to where a future ISP will be established) – serve 
the purpose of generating greater awareness of “something called Israel Studies” and creating 
“enough understanding for them [the students] to want to pursue it as a course of study”.235 
Nonetheless, these competitions comprise only a small part of the process. Far more important 
is the training of indigenous lecturers and supervisors to teach Israel-related courses under the 
so-called ISP training programme, currently co-sponsored between SIGNAL, Bar Illan 
University, and Yad Vesham. According to the SIGNAL website, a typical programme’s length 
is around four months, and begins with a 19-day Holocaust seminar at the Israeli Holocaust 
Museum, Yad Vesham.
236
 Over the following three months, participants are given private 
classes by a variety of academics, covering a wide array of topics ranging from “early Jewish 
settlement during the mandate period to the development of the ‘Sabra’ identity”. SIGNAL 
also organises trips “from the Negev in the south to the Galilee in the north” so as to allow 
participants “to live the history, culture, sights and sounds of Israel”.237 Upon their return to 
China, “lecturers who participated in the program embark on a lecture tour around China to 
explain their experience in Israel and encourage students and faculty around China to become 
involved in Israel Studies”. 238  Some academics are also sent to Brandeis University to be 
enrolled in seminars and specially tailored programmes likely connected with the Schusterman-
backed and newly founded Israel Institute. It is significant to note that Itimar Rabinovich, the 
director of the Israel Institute, has highlighted China as an area of interest, remarking in one 
article that “it is our task to develop Chinese-Israeli academic ties”. He added that “we want to 
help create a cadre of Israel experts in China. China is becoming an increasingly important 
global power. Our task is to help people in China learn Hebrew and understand the 
complexities of Israel”.239 In the case of the SISU ISP, one scholar – Wu Bing – was sent to 
“Brandeis University on a Schusterman Scholarship for Israel Studies training” where, in 
addition to the courses he received under the SIIS, he gave “lectures throughout the semester 
in cooperation with the [Israeli] Ministry of Foreign Affairs”.240 Two other university lecturers 
from SISU were also sent to study for a semester “at Bar-Ilan University to prepare them to 
teach Israeli history, culture and politics to Chinese students”.241 Their studies were “funded by 
a grant from the Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation”.242 
 
To supplement the SISU ISP, SIGNAL provided the programme with materials and books 
from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and the 
Israeli Institute for National Security Studies.
243
 The AJC’s Asia Pacific Institute also “pledged 
to donate more than 100 new and used books on Israel and the Middle East to the university’s 
new Israel studies library”.244 Creating a reservoir of academic material on Israel has always 
been one of SIGNAL’s chief goals. It has for instance commissioned a translation of Barry 
Rubin’s text book, Israel: An Introduction, which overlooks the ways in which war and 
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occupation have impacted Israel’s identity and focuses on dispelling the artificial myths and 
rewriting of history that Israel and its ever complex, diverse, and cultured society is subject to.
245
 
So as to provide maximum access, the book – as with many others – will be published in 
serialised form on SIGNAL’s “Chinese language, on-line academic resource center”.246 This 
resource is intended to provide “introductory to scholarly material on Israel and its people to 
redress misconceptions by offering accurate and easily accessible information”247 on such topics 
as Judaism, Hebrew culture, the phenomenon of anti-semitism, to the “mainstream Israeli 
perspective on terrorism in particular and the Arab Israeli conflict in general”.248 According to a 
SIGNAL report, the resource centre has experienced a “100 percent growth in Chinese web 
traffic every month” with the traffic largely coming “from cities where SIGNAL has ISPs”.249 In 
addition to the provision of these resources, SIGNAL also initiated country-wide lecture tours 
by Israeli or pro-Israeli pundits and scholars such as Saul Singer (whose book, Startup Nation 
has become an important component in Israel’s ‘image creation’ as an advanced and high-tech 
state) Dr. Harold Rhode
250
 (a former US State Department official with ties to the 
neoconservative movement and the Clarion Fund), Ambassador Dore Gold
251
 (showcasing his 
book, The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and The Future of the Holy City, 
wherein he argues, to put it simply, that any division of the city will put it under threat by the 
forces of radical Islam), and Yaakov Kirschen (a Jerusalem Post cartoonist whose work will be 
discussed below) to name just a few. 
 
Marking the spectacular growth in ISPs, SIGNAL co-hosted with the Dr. Naim Dangoor 
Monotheism Program in Bar Illan, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Israeli 
Consulate in Shanghai two conferences in quick succession in June 2012 “commemorating the 
twentieth anniversary of the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between China and 
Israel, and the establishment of Israel studies programs at Chinese universities across the 
country.”252 The first conference was entitled ‘Israeli Studies in China: Introducing One Ancient 
Civilization to Another’ was held in Shanghai International Studies University. The second was 
given the unusual title of ‘Future History: Civil Society vs. State from a Traditional and Modern 
Perspective’ and was held in the Fudan Institute for Advanced Study in Social Sciences, also in 
Shanghai. The conferences brought over 75
253
 Chinese executives, energy experts, and 
“academics from newly formed Israel Studies Programs around the country as well as university 
faculty interested in establishing or investigating Israel Studies and Israeli scholars presenting on 
key fields of study that provide insights into Israel’s society, history, politics, economics, culture, 
foreign affairs, and diplomacy”.254 Amongst the various panels featured – encompassing the 
‘Islamist’ specter in the Arab Spring and the challenges confronting Sino-Israeli relations, there 
were three on “The place of Innovation in Sino-Israeli Business, The strategic importance of 
Oil Alternatives, and a closed session on Energy Security”.255 
 
SIGNAL has been especially active in fostering strategic dialogues with China’s premier 
research and academic institutions, and specifically those “that provide analyses and policy 
recommendations to the Party and the government”. 256 Many of these dialogues, which started 
in 2012 on a bi-monthly basis, were set up for the expressed purpose of providing “a more 
accurate understanding of Israel and the region” to Chinese academics and policymakers.257 
These include the Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS) which is affiliated to the 
Party School of the Central Committee and “provides advanced diplomatic training to all party 
officials,” 258  the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) which is 
under the Ministry of State Security and provides policy recommendations to the State 
Council, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the PLA China Strategy Culture Promotion 
Association which is “under the direct auspices of the Central Military Commission, one of five 
main decision making bodies of China”, the CPC China Center for Contemporary World 
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Studies (CCCWS), a research centre for China’s National Security Office that reportedly 
“wields great influence in Foreign Affairs decision-making”,259 the Foreign Affairs Committee 
for China’s National People’s Congress, the Department of Foreign Affairs at the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry (SIGNAL has also sent – in one clear instance of seeking to directly alter 
China’s diplomatic stance – delegations to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to convey 
Israel’s position over Iran),260 and the Xinhua News Agency where SIGNAL not only maintains 
a close relationship with its World Affairs Studies Center (whose president “personally advises 
the PRC’s Standing Committee”), but has also started a joint project which aims in “bringing 
analyses from leading Israeli thinkers to the PRC’s leadership”.261 Xinhua’s coverage of Prime 
Minister Netenyahu’s visit to China was highlighted by SIGNAL’s publications as one of its 
major accomplishments in that regard. In addition to these dialogues and reports, SIGNAL has 
been keen on bringing Chinese academics and scholars to Israel where,
262
 because to its 
“geographic proximity to the Arab nations” they can learn about the region (and Israel’s 
stability) “without being drawn into the fray”.263 Researchers affiliated with particularly influential 
institutions with connections to the Chinese political establishment are prioritised and an effort 
is made to bring such scholars to major Israel plenums. Catrice Witte was reportedly “excited” 
about getting Liang Yabin, a research fellow from the Party School affiliated IISS, to the 2013 
Herzliya conference given that the last head of the school was the Chinese premier, Li 
Keqiang.
264
 
 
In 2012, the organisation helped found the Center for Contemporary Sino-Israel Studies 
(CCSIS) in Shanghai Jiaotong University (SJTU), which “focuses on policy oriented research as 
well as interdisciplinary projects, capitalising on SJTU’s diverse fields of expertise from 
international relations to space science”.265  The centre is under the direction of Zhang Junhua, 
from SJTU’s School of Public Affairs and Barry Rubin, the director of GLORIA. It is reported 
that the centre received official sanction from the Chinese Ministry of Education in September 
2012, which means that it will eventually be a recipient of government funding to sustain its 
research.
266
 For now, the centre has launched two major research tracks. The first is on 
’Transportation Energy Security and Oil Alternatives’, a joint effort involving the CCSIS, the 
IISS, the Central Party School, and the Israeli Institute for Economic Planning. The aim of the 
project is to research “the risks of oil dependency in relation to financial and political stability” 
with an eye on “investigating the potential of Oil Alternative technologies”. 267  The second track 
centres on a string of Middle Eastern issues including Sino-Israel relations in light of the Arab 
uprisings, developments in Syria, the Iranian nuclear issue, US and EU policy in the region, 
and ethnic conflict. The IISS, the Central Party School, and GLORIA at IDC Herzliya are 
reported as major research partners, with the track outcome being to formulate “policy 
recommendations based on the research” for both sides. 268  Although unmentioned on the 
SIGNAL website, the Dr. Naim Dangoor Program in Bar Illan was apparently involved in the 
establishment of CCSIS, reporting in one of its publications that “at least five additional 
universities are expected to follow suit” with the opening of Sino-Israel Studies Centers “in the 
upcoming academic year (2013)”. 269   
 
It is worth noting that SIGNAL’s focus on SJTU stems – according to its own publications – 
from its importance “as a key institution for the training of diplomatic staff” and from which 
“over half of all Chinese foreign ministry, embassy and consulate postings within China and 
globally”.270 In addition to the CCSIS and the ISP projects already mentioned, SIGNAL also 
helped the SJTU’s Middle East Research Center design a “pilot trip of a new Chinese public 
diplomacy initiative in the Middle East” dubbed ‘Constructive Participation in the Middle East’ 
(CPME.)
 271
 Launched in February 2012, a 30-member delegation made up “of business leaders 
of companies with portfolios of tens of millions of dollars visited Israel” and the Palestinian 
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Authority (PA) on a 4-day trip, reportedly to find investment opportunities there.
272
 According 
to their publication “SIGNAL built an agenda which illustrated a holistic picture of Israel and 
the Israeli business climate including a networking event with Israeli CEOs and a talk by Israeli 
Deputy National Security Adviser, Eran Lerman”. 273  
 
SIGNAL is also apparently considering taking on some of the media-related activities the Israel 
Project (TIP) used to oversee prior to its withdrawal from China in late 2012. The TIP – “a 
private initiative funded by wealthy backers that engaged journalists (and others) with 
information targeting their working needs”274 – had originally started its media operations in 
China around 2010 at the behest of Jennifer Laszlo Mizrahi, the TIP’s founder and president. 
From what can be gleaned from Mizrahi’s 2010 Jerusalem Post Op-Ed Pro-Israel Groups Must 
Adapt to the New World: We Need to Do Things Right, concern over the global media fallout 
from the Gaza flotilla incident catalysed the expansion of advocacy into places like China.
275
 It 
was a high-time, she argued, that the Western-focused paradigm be broken in favour of a more 
robust, and global form of advocacy. Laura Kam, a TIP-affiliate expanded a bit more on the 
organisation’s new tilt in another Op-Ed for the Jerusalem Post Leveraging China’s Lack of 
Knowledge About Israel, written a year later. As the title itself would suggest, the TIP 
recognised that “Israel is still largely a blank slate to most Chinese”.276 According to Kam, this 
meant that there was a “real opportunity to make a significant impact on [China’s] decision-
making and views concerning [Israel] and the wider Middle East”. In part she bases this on the 
findings of a TIP-sponsored study conducted by pollster Stanley Greenburg on focus groups 
consisting of “educated opinion elites in Shanghai in June 2010” revealing widespread 
“admiration for Israel’s strengths in technology, finance and military”. “Israel supporters”, she 
contends “should leverage these attitudes by pointing out the benefits of a strengthened 
relationship, focusing on security, technology and information-sharing”.277  
 
In 2011, TIP launched a China Program headed by Alex Pevzner who was to be “responsible 
for establishing working relations with Chinese-speaking journalists and leaders” and, more 
importantly, “developing materials and implementing programs to provide them with 
information about issues that impact Israel’s security and future”.278 During that year alone, TIP 
arranged 32 meetings with “top Chinese media and partner groups, including President Hu 
Zhanfan of the Guangming Daily, “a party newspaper geared to the intellectual elite” and 
Deputy Director Liu Shuiming of the People’s Daily, “the official voice of the Communist 
Party’s Central Committes”.279 These meetings were aimed at finding grounds for cooperation 
with these outlets and creating a framework for information-sharing that would allow the TIP to 
shape media discourses about Israel. TIP’s China Program also encompassed a clear 
promotion of the ‘Startup Nation’ narrative centred around the showcasing of Israeli 
technology in alternative/clean energy, pollution, and agriculture.
 280
 To that end, Saul Singer – 
the abovementioned author of the ‘Start-Up Nation’ was brought to China in December 2011 
by TIP (with close cooperation with the Israeli Embassy in Beijing and the Consulate General 
in Shanghai, as well as SIGNAL) on a highly-publicised national tour that included four 
Chinese cities on its itinerary – Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, and Nanjing (at SISU and the 
Glazer Institute in Nanjing with regards to the latter two). During the tour, Singer “met with 
over 50 journalists, giving one-on-one and group interviews, for print and TV”. 281   TIP’s 
growing operations in China folded when “board members ultimately rejected Mizrahi’s view 
of China as a key arena in the battle to influence public opinion on Israel” 282 – a policy shift 
likely associated with the “more American-centered vision” of  TIP’s new CEO, former 
spokesmen of AIPAC Josh Block.
 283 
As a result, TIP cut back on its China Program, although it 
continues to maintain an active presence on the Chinese weibo.
284 
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According to the talks given in the 2013 Jewish Funders Network conference, SIGNAL is 
currently discussing with donors a possible expansion in the portfolio of activities it oversees in 
wake of TIP’s premature departure from China. While no official endorsement is to be found 
on the SIGNAL website, mention should be made of Project 3500 (or the Drybones Project) 
created by the Jerusalem Post cartoonist Yacoov Kirschen as part of SIGNAL’s outreach and 
advocacy efforts. Kirschen
285
 has been showcased in a number of outlets including the NewYork 
Times, Time Magazine, Los Angeles Times, CBS and AP, is identified as a SIGNAL ‘senior 
fellow’ by the official website.286 He appears to be a good friend of Carice Witte, probably 
through the Yale network, and was brought by SIGNAL to give a series of lectures in SJTU, 
Henan University, and SISU in 2011.
287
 During his trip to China, Kirschen sensed “a unique 
opportunity to improve Jewish-China and Israel-China relations”.288 More notably, he felt that 
the “willful erasing of 3,500 years of Israel’s history” by enemies seeking to portray it “as a 
colonial state built on the lands of the indigenous people, the Palestinian Arabs”, has “not yet 
infected the 1.3 billion Chinese”. 289  To this end, and upon his return to Israel Kirschen 
launched Project 3500, which he envisioned would help educate “China about Israel’s 3500 
years of history” and more importantly “inoculate the 1.3 billion Chinese against this modern 
libel”. The project would entail providing “a series of free, online, digital Chinese-language 
graphic books” available on a number of popular electronic platforms ranging from apps and 
eBooks “in a form and with content that will appeal to both the Chinese establishment and 
Chinese university students alike”.290 Kirschen is keen on tying through his work “the history of 
China to the history of Israel, emphasising the concept of the Jews and the Chinese as two 
ancient civilisations which have survived centuries of attack by barbarian forces and foreign 
empires”.291 He sees both countries “as bearers of ancient wisdoms” who have a “responsibility 
to do more. To bring civilization and stability to a chaotic world”.292 More interestingly, he sees 
both countries as facing similar challenges, ranging from the threats “posed by globalization and 
a cut-off from the past” to “partners in an effort to counter their ‘demonization by the West’”. 293  
Kirschen has also reached out to Chinese scholars like Pan Guang, Yue Yong (Vice President 
of SISU,) Chen Yiyi, Ma Xiaolin, and Wang Hongxu (a professor from the Central Party 
School) for endorsements.
294
   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The recent development of Israeli soft diplomacy in China represents a synthesis between a 
new ‘East-ward’ consciousness on the part of the Israel and its supporters (a characteristic 
shared with many other neighbouring Middle Eastern countries) and the expansion of hasbara 
academic initiatives, funded as they are by philanthropists and wealthy funders, well beyond 
their original confines in the West. It aims to not only reproduce the institutional frameworks 
of influence as they exist in the US and elsewhere, but to more significantly re-shape the 
production of knowledge about the Middle East within Chinese academia in ways that could 
potentially result in a more Israel-friendly Chinese foreign policy. It remains to be seen 
however whether such efforts will bear any tangible fruit over the short or even medium-term. 
There are, first of all, structural inhibitions that circumscribe or blunt the effectiveness of this 
advocacy – a cautious political establishment careful in not antagonising the Islamic and Arab 
political spaces (hence the low-key nature of this engagement) a residual cultural sympathy with 
Arab narratives about Israel and the conflict within Chinese academia, and perhaps more 
importantly, the absence of any direct cultural identification with Jewish culture that translates 
into political support (as say the Western history of anti-Semitism). Secondly, it must be 
recognised that for the most part, pro-Israeli advocacy has been a somewhat recent 
33 | P a g e  
 
phenomenon, and while gaining traction and making headway, it remains in its infancy and will 
likely require many years to have its presence felt within the Chinese political arena.   
 
The problem of course is not that advocacy is taking place – although one could raise issue 
with the distortion this politicisation brings into academia – but that there are no existing 
counter-narratives and alternative resources being made available. The greatest danger that 
arises from such a state of affairs – particularly for the Arab states, but this is also applicable to 
Iran and other Muslim countries – is consolidate a one-sided narrative which ‘explains’ the 
region to Chinese scholars and academics. This is not to say of course that Chinese scholars are 
passive actors in this equation, but long-term investment on the part of pro-Israeli advocates will 
necessarily translate into a growing capacity to influence and shape discourses about the Middle 
East amongst future generations of scholars.   
 
Responding to this advocacy will entail a massive change in current Arab diplomatic 
approaches and outreach in China. While some form of academic engagement has been 
pursued over the years – the Sultan Qaboos Chair in the Arabic Department of Peking 
University, the Sheikh Zayed Center in Beijing Foreign Languages University, and growing 
Saudi exchange programmes and academic projects (book fairs, book translations, etc.) – these 
efforts have been inadequate and largely confined to the study of Islam and the Arabic language. 
Little has been done in the way of actually engaging regional studies departments in Chinese 
universities and think tanks, or for the matter, in enhancing the understanding of Chinese 
academics on the political economy, structural problems, and socio-cultural issues facing the 
Arab world today. This has meant that while links with the local Hui Muslim communities have 
developed somewhat, outreach to the larger Han population is almost nonexistent. Some Arab 
states, particularly Saudi Arabia, have sought to engage the Chinese public, as epitomised by 
the Saudi presence in the 2010 Shanghai Expo, but these efforts remain quite unsophisticated 
and dependent on the pursuit of ‘prestige projects’. More disconcertingly, many Arab states, 
including Saudi, lack a viable digital presence on the Chinese internet – a major venue for 
public relations.  
 
The Arab countries, but especially the Gulf states,
295
 must seriously consider the need for a new 
public outreach policy in China that involves a more active engagement with academia. This 
would mean investing in the development of Middle Eastern and even Israeli studies 
programmes initiating strategic dialogues with influential think tanks and government-affiliated 
research centres, translating texts on the Arab world into Chinese, facilitating field research and 
direct conversations with government and media bodies, and bringing academics on lecture 
tours, amongst many other possibilities. This outreach, however, should be qualitatively 
different from an Arab-version of ‘hasbara’ however, avoiding advocacy for a ‘single’ Arab state, 
and should be geared towards informing Chinese academics about the realities on the ground 
from a regional perspective embracing both critical and oppositional voices as a whole. These 
efforts should not be opposed to cooperating with Jewish and Israeli-focused centers in China, 
as they can be perfect venues for the development of genuinely objective academic discussions 
on Israel and Palestine. It may also prove prudent to include other regional actors – and 
particularly those in disagreement with official Arab narratives - in this academic outreach such 
as Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan (and possibly even minority groupings such as Copts, Assyrians, 
Kurds and others), in an overall effort to revamp and improve Chinese understanding of the 
region and its communities. In tandem with this, the Arab states must begin the process of 
developing their own China knowledge-base, a process that can only be accomplished with the 
cultivation of links with Chinese academia.  
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